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Privacy-preserving, and more concretely differentially private machine learning, is
concerned with hiding specific details in training datasets which contain sensitive
information. Many proposed differentially private machine learning algorithms have
promising theoretical properties, such as convergence to non-private performance in
the limit of infinite data, computational efficiency, and polynomial sample complexity.
Unfortunately, these properties have not always translated to real-world applications
of private machine learning methods, which is why their adoption by practitioners has
been slow. For many typical problems and sample sizes classification accuracy has
been unsatisfactory. Through feature selection which preserves end-to-end privacy, this
work has demonstrated that private machine learning algorithms can indeed be useful in
practice. In particular, we propose a new feature selection mechanism, which fits well
with the design constraints imposed by differential privacy, and allows for improved
scalability of private classifiers in realistic settings. We investigate differentially private
Naive Bayes and Logistic Regression and show non-trivial performance on a number of
datasets. Significant empirical evidence suggests that the number of features and number
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Few issues in this new era of Big Data have been dogged by as much controversy as
privacy. Arguably, this basic human right is being destroyed by governments and private
institutions alike. “Relying on the government to protect your privacy is like asking a
peeping tom to install your window blinds,” says John Perry Barlow, voicing a growing
public concern.
With great data comes great responsibility, but many institutions have failed to
carry it out. While data has been successfully utilized in numerous domains to improve
quality of life, publishing results of data analytics has not been completely uneventful.
Many attempts to solve real world problems with machine learning have resulted
in privacy breaches, the most cited of which is the de-anonymization of the Netflix
user movie ratings dataset (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008). The attempt by Netflix
to improve its recommendation engine resulted in a million-dollar lawsuit (Newman,
2009) and all following competitions getting cancelled. Other incidents include the
AOL search data leak (Wikipedia, 2004), a genome wide association study identity and
disease leak (Wang et al., 2009), the Taxicab passenger privacy leak (Atockar, 2014),
and personal data leaks in online advertising (Korolova, 2010).
Privacy leaks like these result from the intrinsic peculiarity of high-dimensional data:
such samples are unique too often. With just a little side information it was possible
to uniquely identify individuals in the above datasets, even though obvious identifiers,
such as names, social security numbers, address, etc. had been removed. Consider
the linkage attack on the Netflix dataset. The attackers correlated the movie ratings
in a publicly available IMDb dataset with the movie ratings in the Netflix dataset and
matched with high accuracy the anonymized records from the Netflix dataset with the
public profiles in the IMDb dataset.
1
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To combat privacy attacks which rely on background information, some more robust
formal definitions of privacy have been formulated. Work on privacy of statistical
databases started with the definition of statistical disclosure, and progressed to data
scrubbing, and k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002) and its variants, including l-diversity
(Machanavajjhala et al., 2007) and t-closeness (Li et al., 2007). All of these approaches
group samples by their sensitive attribute. Privacy is then satisfied only if the number of
samples in each group is large enough. Another common denominator is the approaches’
modelling of the possible auxiliary information an attacker could possess. When the
assumptions break, so does the privacy guarantee of these methods, failing to prevent
the above privacy leaks.
Differential privacy is an emerging definition which dictates that the presence or
absence of an individual from a database cannot affect the released statistics significantly.
This formal notion of privacy avoids side information assumptions by requiring privacy
in the worst case scenario: an attacker knowing all but one entry in a database. In this
way, independent of the auxiliary information available to an attacker, they are unable
to discern the participation of an individual in the database.
A private algorithm, also referred to as a mechanism, guarantees differential privacy
by returning a noisy version of a non-private algorithm’s output. For example, if the
private mechanism counts fingers on a hand it might return four instead of five. Privacy
is achieved by adding a noise vector from a certain distribution, such that the private
output is relatively close to the true one, in some sense. If only a little noise is added,
the privacy restrictions are relaxed, and the output is very close to the true one. A
user of the private algorithm’s output can draw similar conclusions from the data, as
they would from the non-private algorithm. On the other hand, if the noise is large in
magnitude, the privacy guarantee is stricter, but the utility of the data deteriorates. This
privacy-utility trade-off is the cornerstone of practical private mechanisms.
High-dimensional data offers many challenges for machine learning, and even more
so for privacy-preserving machine learning. Existing differentially private mechanisms
struggle with high-dimensional data (Stoddard et al., 2014; Dwork et al., 2014; Ji et al.,
2014; Fredrikson et al., 2014). When the input dataset to a randomized algorithm (a
learning procedure, for example) has a large number of features, a prohibitive amount
of noise compared to the signal in the data has to be added, rendering it close to useless.
Diminished accuracy as a result of privacy restrictions can be naturally overcome
with additional data. Unfortunately, depending on the dimensionality of the dataset and
the stringency of the privacy requirement, the amount of extra data required for good
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utility ranges from significant to exorbitant (see Appendix B).
This work aims to evaluate and extend applications of differential privacy to machine
learning. The focus is on binary classification problems where the dimensionality of
the data is non-trivial and the amount of data is insufficient for high-accuracy private
results using existing algorithms.
Much of the prior work on privacy preserving computation has focused on the release
of privatized data. After perturbing the data itself, standard machine learning technology
could then be employed making use of it, producing a private model. However, for
most real world datasets, the amount of noise added to the data is intolerable (Brickell
and Shmatikov, 2008). Instead, later approaches, and the approach taken in this work,
integrate the privacy guarantees into the algorithm, ensuring that the algorithm is private
while still using raw data. This strategy is underpinned by the principle that the smallest
amount of information has to be released if the private mechanism is to be effective.
Instead of publishing the whole dataset, only the model parameters are published,
considerably less information.
1.1 Our contributions
Most research in differential privacy in machine learning has created counterparts of
existing machine learning methods, but the scalability properties of these methods to
real high-dimensional datasets remain to be investigated. This work begins to provide
insight into these practical issues by focusing on basic differentially private classification
approaches. We demonstrate the successful use of the differentially private Naive Bayes
classifier with stringent privacy guarantees on several high-dimensional datasets. We
further compare these results with the negative results of private logistic regression. In
particular,
• We provide a review section which aims to make differential privacy more ap-
proachable to practitioners, where we give several intuitive and rigorous justifi-
cations for composition theorems, as well as the generality of the Exponential
Mechanism, a standard approach to creating differentially private algorithms.
• We develop, theoretically justify, and empirically evaluate differentially private
Naive Bayes Maximum Likelihood Estimation. We employ the established
Laplace mechanism and show that private Naive Bayes scales poorly to high-
dimensional real-world datasets.
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• To address this issue, we employ univariate differentially private feature selection.
We detail several naive approaches to the problem and justify their low scalability
with the dimensionality of the problem. We further develop a new univariate
feature selection technique based on dynamic programming and the Exponential
Mechanism for which the privacy guarantees degrade with the number of features
to be selected, rather than the original dimensionality of the problem.
• We further develop an original differentially private feature selection heuristic
based on a low sensitivity count-based metric, which, together with the feature
selection algorithm, achieves significantly better results than private Naive Bayes
on its own. We also provide comparisons with the private version of the standard
univariate feature selection technique of using the mutual information of each
feature with the class label and show that the count-based heuristic has significant
advantages.
• Finally, we analyse and empirically evaluate several approaches to private logistic
regression, showing their poor performance on real-world high-dimensional
datasets.
Chapter 2
Differential Privacy and Machine
Learning
The search for a formal framework in which to develop privacy-preserving algorithms
has circled in on differential privacy. This is a condition on a randomized algorithm
which requires that the participation of any individual in an input dataset should not
alter the probability of any outcome of the algorithm too much. Since the output does
not change significantly it cannot be used to infer any individual’s data, or even the
participation of the individual if the data is known. We now state the definition of
differential privacy more formally, after setting up some necessary notation.
2.1 Definition
In the privacy literature, mechanism is a generic term for a private randomized algorithm.
It could be any query to a database, a training procedure, or any other algorithm whose
randomized output protects the privacy the original data.
Notation The notation used here follows Hall (2013) and is summarized in table
2.1. Let X be the space of all possible datasets. A (non-private) algorithm on datasets
in X can be characterized in terms of the function it outputs. A deterministic algorithm
produces a vector dX = d(X) of a finite dimensionality D on a dataset X , whose elements
could be real numbers, integers, or binary. The algorithm is completely described by
the set of vectors {dX : X 2 X }. For each possible dataset, a randomized algorithm
induces a distribution over the output vectors in RD. This distribution is referred to as
PX , when the input dataset is X . Thus, a randomized algorithm is characterized by the
distributions {PX : X 2 X }.
5
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Notation Meaning
X the set of all possible datasets
X ,X 0 two datasets in X ; this is the design matrix aug-
mented with the label vector
X ⇠ X 0 two adjacent (aka neighbouring) datasets in X :
X 0 was created by taking all samples of X and
adding one new sample
|X X 0| the set of all examples that are either in X or in
X 0, but not both
P the private mechanism
{dX : X 2 X } all possible outputs of a non-private algorithm P
{PX : X 2 X } all possible distributions induced on the output
space by mechanism P
z a sample from the distribution characterizing the
private mechanism
Z the range of the private mechanism
PX(z) P(P (X) = z) or PX(z 2 Z), the probability of
the private mechanism P producing output z on
a dataset X
dPX(z) the probability density characterizing the distri-
bution PX of mechanism P on dataset X
e privacy parameter
D global sensitivity
d(z,X) the distance metric of the exponential mecha-
nism
N number of examples in the dataset
D number of dimensions in the dataset
L(q) likelihood function
Table 2.1: Summary of notation
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The output of a private algorithm is then a sample from PX . We will use PX(z) to
mean the probability of the private mechanism P producing output z on a dataset X . In
other words,
PX(z) = P(P (X) = z). (2.1)
Finally, differential privacy is concerned with what happens to the output of a private
mechanism when the input changes. To formally define the privacy guarantee, we need
a formal definition of the distance between two datasets.
Definition 2.1.1. Two datasets X and X 0 are said to be adjacent or neighbouring when-
ever they differ in one example, i.e. X 0 was created by taking all samples in X and
adding one new sample. Thus the set of all samples that are in X 0 but not in X has
cardinality 1, |X 0  X |= 1, and the set of all samples that are in X but not in X 0 is empty,
|X X 0|= 0.
We are now ready to state the definition of differential privacy.
Definition 2.1.2. A randomized algorithm P = {PX : X 2 X } on the probability space
(w,Z,P) satisfies e-differential privacy if for any two adjacent databases X and X 0 and




In this definition the distribution is over the choices made by the randomized algorithm.
The ratio is interpreted to be 1 if PX(z) and PX 0(z) are both 0.
Interpretation For an algorithm, being differentially private means that it protects
its input dataset against an adversary who knows all but one of its samples. In that
sense differential privacy is a worst-case guarantee, since there is no upper bound on
the amount of information an attacker can possess.
To understand how privacy of a sample is preserved under this guarantee, consider
the hypothesis test performed by the attacker, whose goal is to find out the values of the
last sample in the database. The hypothesis test was first laid out by Wasserman and
Zhou (2009) and is carried out as follows. Two hypothesis H0: X and H1: X 0 are tested,
where only X 0 contains the sample in question. The power of the hypothesis test is
controlled by the privacy parameter (Wasserman and Zhou, 2009), (Oh and Viswanath,
2013). Let Z be the set of outputs of the private mechanism for which H1 is rejected
and ZC be the set of outputs for which H0 is rejected. Then the false alarm probability
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and the missing detection probability are
PFA = P(P (X) 2 ZC) (2.3)
PMD = P(P (X 0) 2 Z) (2.4)
Applying the differential privacy definition 2.1.2, we get
1 PFA = P(P (X) 2 Z) eeP(P (X 0) 2 Z) = eePMD (2.5)
or
eePMD +PFA   1. (2.6)
Similarly,
PMD + eePFA   1 (2.7)
can be obtained by switching the two datasets in definition 2.1.2. Since 1 PMD is
the true positive rate, it is also possible to draw the ROC curve for the hypothesis test
(1 PMD as a function of the false positive rate).
A relaxed definition of differential privacy also exists, which allows the failure of
the exact differential privacy criterion with probability at most d, where the probability
is due to the randomized algorithm.
Definition 2.1.3. A randomized algorithm P = {PX : X 2 X } on the probability space
(w,Z,P) satisfies (e,d)-differential privacy if for any two adjacent databases X and X 0
and for all events z 2 Z
PX(z) eePX 0(z)+d. (2.8)
In this work we focus on exact differential privacy, but many of the analysis pre-
sented here can easily be extended to the approximate differential privacy guarantee.
To sum up, the differential privacy constraint means that the false alarm probability
and the missing detection probability cannot both be too small. Thus, in essence, the
differential privacy guarantee quantifies how difficult the attacker’s inference would be.
2.2 Basic Mechanisms
This section details established techniques for performing differentially private com-
putations on sensitive data. We discuss the private release of D-dimensional vectors.
There are several ways of ensuring that a private mechanism P satisfies e-differential
privacy and we detail the most frequently used below.
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2.2.1 Laplace Mechanism
Consider a non-private algorithm which outputs a vector d. A private mechanism could
report this vector by perturbing it in some direction, by adding a noise vector drawn from
a Laplace distribution with an appropriate scale and zero mean. Such perturbation is the
basis of the Laplace mechanism, which achieves e-differential privacy by scaling the
noise distribution according to the privacy parameter. The resulting vector z preserves
e-differential privacy.











kdX  dX 0k1 (2.10)
is the global sensitivity, defined as the maximum change in the output of the non-private
algorithm over all possible neighboring datasets.
The variance of the Laplace distribution is 2(D/e)2. Therefore, the magnitude of
the added noise will be proportional to the sensitivity and inversely proportional to e.
Decreasing e flattens out the noise distribution, resulting in noisier estimates. For a
given e, increasing the sensitivity also results in more perturbation.
Global sensitivity The global sensitivity of a function (vector) as defined in 2.10
represents the magnitude by which a single individual’s data can change the function in
the worst case. It typically depends on N, the size of the input database and is on the
order of O(N 1) (Hall, 2013). This definition of sensitivity is natural: it gives an upper
bound on the amount of perturbation necessary to preserve privacy.









































That is to say, the Laplace mechanism can be applied by sampling each direction
independently from a Laplace distribution with scale the sensitivity over the privacy
parameter.
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2|+ · · ·+max |dD d
0
D|, (2.18)
where we have denoted dX 0 = (d
0
1, . . . ,d
0
D). Thus, D = D1 +D2 + · · ·+DD, where Di is
the sensitivity along dimension i. Let us decompose the privacy budget as well, such that
e = e1+e2+ · · ·+eD. What would happen if each direction was sampled independently











? Direction 1 preserves e1-differential
privacy, direction 2 preserves e2-differential privacy and so on. The joint probability
of z is the product of the probabilities in each direction. The e-differential privacy
guarantee is preserved:
PX(z1, . . . ,zD)




⇥ · · ·⇥ PX(zD)
PX 0(zD)
 exp(e1) . . .exp(eD) = exp(e1 + · · ·+ eD).
(2.19)
The above holds for any split of the sensitivity or the total privacy budget. If, however,






























To summarize, the differential privacy guarantee permits both different sensitivities
and different privacy budgets for each dimension. The Laplace mechanism is applied
to each dimension independently. We now continue with the proof of the Laplace
mechanism’s differential privacy guarantee.
Proof. The proof of the Laplace mechanism’s e-differential privacy is from (Dwork,
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eedPX 0 = eePX 0(z).




This completes the proof.
Using different norms Following are stated three facts, which will motivate a more
general version of the Laplace mechanism which replaces the l1-norm.
1. Triangle inequality Also called Minkowski’s inequality for general norms, kx+
ykp  kxkp +kykp 8p 2 R, such that p  1.
2. Order on norms Using Minkowski’s inequality it is further possible to prove
that the l1-norm is the largest, i.e. kakp = (Âni=0 |ai|p)1/p  (Â
n 1
i=0 |ai|p)1/p +
|apn |1/p  · · ·Âni=0 |ai|= kak1. More generally, k⇤kq  k⇤kp whenever p q,
i.e. the Euclidean norm of a vector is smaller than the Manhattan and so on.
The proof of the Laplace mechanism depends solely on the triangle inequality of
norms. Making use of the more general Minkowski’s inequality, it is easy to see that an
analogue of the Laplace mechanism is possible that replaces the l1-norm with a p-norm.








where Dp is the sensitivity defined with respect to the p-norm. The mechanism is still



















Sampling from the distribution in 2.24 is more difficult compared with the Laplace
mechanism. Here, the distribution no longer decomposes along each direction. Having
said that, it is possible to sample from 2.24 algorithmically by sampling the direction of
z uniformly at random, and sampling the norm of z from G(D, Dpe ) (Hall, 2013).
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Let us compare the variance of the noise vector sampled from 2.24 first using the
l1-norm and then the l2-norm for a D dimensional problem. Let the sensitivity be
defined respecting the corresponding norm, i.e. Dl1 be the sensitivity with respect to
the l1-norm and Dl2 be the sensitivity with respect to the l2-norm. The l1-norm allows
us to sample each dimension independently, and so the norm of the resulting vector
will be the sum of the norms in each dimension. The variance of a sum of independent
variables is the sum of their variances:
Var[|z|] = Var[|z1|]+ ...+Var[|zD|]. (2.25)




















, which only differs from Equation 2.26 in the sensitivity. Even
though the variance of the norm of the noise vector reduces if the sensitivity is defined
with a form different from l1, the total amount of perturbation resulting from privacy
does not necessarily.
Consider Figure 2.1 which shows samples from the Laplace mechanism, as well
as the more general mechanism with different norms, where the sensitivity along each
dimension is 1. Figure 2.1a shows the Laplace mechanism with scale Dl1/e = 2/e;
Figures 2.1b and 2.1c show samples from the more general mechanism with norms 2
and 10, respectively, i.e. scales Dl2/e =
p
2/e and D10/e = 10
p
2/e. The distribution in
2.1a is diamond-shaped, while the other two are closer to a circle. When the norm is
changed, so is the shape of the distribution of the magnitude of the noise vector. In
our 2-dimensional example, the more general norms allow big changes in all directions
equally, whereas the l1-norm allows big changes to the horizontal and vertical dimension
only and keeps the diagonal changes relatively small. In terms of the final performance
of the private mechanism, it may be better to allow big perturbations in only one
dimension, thus eliminating possible benefits from using general norms.
Having said that, one reason for using a p-norm is that the l1-norm is not everywhere
differentiable. In particular, in scenarios where the private mechanism optimizes an
objective, it might be necessary or beneficial to add a noise vector prior to optimization.
Optimization methods are often gradient-based and require that the objective function
is differentiable. Thus it is necessary to avoid the l1 norm. An example application of
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(a) Samples from Laplace(0,
2/e).
(b) Samples from 2.24 with
mean 0 and scale
p
2/e.
(c) Samples from 2.24 with
mean 0 and scale 10
p
2/e.
Figure 2.1: 2000 samples from each distribution together with the probability density
as estimated on a grid set up by the range of the data. The norms used are l1, l2, and
p-norm with p = 10, respectively.
the l2-norm appears in (Chaudhuri et al., 2011). More details on optimization with the
l2-norm are available in chapter 4.
Accuracy of the Laplace mechanism The following theorem gives the accuracy
bounds with respect to the sample complexity for the Laplace mechanism and is
taken from (Dwork and Roth, 2014). First, we state a general fact about the Laplace





P(z  tb) = exp( t). (2.27)
Theorem 2.2.2. For a counting query f : X ! RD and an output of the Laplace mecha-

















where X is the set of datasets; D is the number of queries that we want answered;kxk•
is the max norm defined as the maximum of the absolute values of x’s components; D is
the sensitivity of the mechanism; and p 2 (0,1] is a probability.
As an example application of Theorem 2.2.2 consider counting the frequency of
1000 names in a dataset of participants in an annual census (Dwork and Roth, 2014).
This is a counting query, where the response is R1000 and the sensitivity is 1. If e= 1 and
p = 0.05, then with probability 95%, no estimate will be off by more than an additive
error of log 10000.05 ⇡ 10. In our example this is a relatively good guarantee: our estimate
will be relatively good because we have a large number of samples (the participants in
the census).
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Geometric mechanism The Laplace mechanism is well-suited to real-valued out-
puts. To use the Laplace mechanism when the output of the private mechanism is
discrete, it is necessary to round the output of the Laplace mechanism to an integer.
Rounding preserves e-differential privacy, because it is a post-processing operation (see
Theorem 2.3.1).
One might wonder if a private mechanism is available which is more privacy
efficient in cases where the output of the wanted mechanism is discrete. Indeed, an
approach called the Geometric mechanism exists, which samples the output of the
private mechanism from a symmetric Geometric distribution. First proposed by (Ghosh
et al., 2012) in the context of fixed count queries it has been shown to be expected-loss-
minimizing for all possible users, regardless of their background knowledge, subject to
the differential privacy constraint.
Having said that it is unlikely that the Geometric mechanism outperforms the
Laplace mechanism in practice. According to (Ghosh et al., 2012), the Laplace mecha-
nism is itself approximately universally utility maximizing for most interesting privacy
levels, for the authors’ definition of utility. In fact, for the usual values of e, the Laplace
mechanism and the Geometric mechanism have nearly identical utility guarantees.
This observation is further confirmed by (Geng and Viswanath, 2013). Their work
has found that for histogram release, the optimal solution is a symmetric staircase
mechanism, which, for queries of sensitivity 1, is identical to the Geometric mechanism.
They have further shown that in practice, the Laplace mechanism is not significantly
outperformed by the staircase mechanism.
2.2.2 Exponential Mechanism
The exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007) is a generalization of the
Laplace mechanism useful in situations where the wanted output is discrete or categori-
cal. All possible differentially private algorithms could be phrased as the exponential
mechanism, because it allows the possible outputs of the mechanism to be rated by any
criterion which seems reasonable in the particular domain.
The exponential mechanism like the Laplace mechanism defines a distribution over
the range of the function to be computed privately. It achieves this by the use of a quality
function: a function which judges the usefulness of an output to the user of the private
mechanism. The distribution arising from the exponential mechanism is intuitively
fitting. The true output is the most likely, and other outputs get exponentially less likely
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with their decreasing quality. Taking the quality function to be the negative of the
cost function, the exponential mechanism effectively samples a Boltzmann distribution.
Listed below is the Boltzmann probability density function with energy parameter E(z)





where Z is the normalization constant.
Distance Metric vs Fitness score In the differential privacy literature, the function
which specifies the quality of possible outputs is often referred to as the quality score
function or fitness score function. The energy parameter of the Boltzmann distribution
is considered a cost, so the quality function is the negative energy,  E(z). This function
shows how good the output of the private mechanism is compared to the truth and
increases as the “goodness” of the output increases.
To be in accordance with the standard definition of a Boltzmann distribution, this
text will prefer the term distance metric. It is a cost function that shows how bad the
output of the private mechanism is compared to the true output. The distance metric
function increases as the “badness” of the output increases.











The idea behind the mechanism is to make high quality outputs exponentially more
likely at a rate that depends on the sensitivity of the quality score and the privacy
parameter. Intuitively, the mechanism can be thought of a noisy-max picking a noisy
“best” output.
The exponential mechanism looks similar to the Laplace mechanism (more on this
later), but has a 2 in the denominator of the exponent. The additional 2 results from the
ratio of normalization constants Z(X)/Z(X 0) contributing another factor of exp(e/2) to
the ratio of dPX(z)/dP0X(z). The complete proof of the exponential mechanism provides
more details. This is shown in the discrete case, but the continuous case is similar.
Proof. The exponential mechanism creates a probability distribution on the output
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since the sensitivity is the maximum change in the distance function over any two
neighboring datasets X ⇠ X 0. In addition, in the second multiplier we can substitute for









































 ee/2ee/2 = ee (2.39)
Integrating, to get probabilities, we obtain






eedPX 0(z) = ee
Z
Z
dPX 0(z) = eePX 0(z 2 Z), (2.40)
which completes the proof.
The quality score function is user-defined and could be any function which embodies
the usefulness of outputs, such that the final distribution is not too flat. Otherwise, bad
outputs would be too probable and the mechanism will suffer in performance compared
with its non-private counterpart. Indeed, consider the exponential mechanism with a
quality score the distance from the true output.
The Laplace Mechanism is a special case of the Exponential Mechanism When
the output of an algorithm is RD with the appropriate choice of norm and score function,
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the exponential mechanism becomes the Laplace mechanism. Indeed, consider the ex-
ponential mechanism with distance metric the distance from the true answer multiplied
by 2:
d(z,X) = 2kdX   zk1. (2.41)
The sensitivity of this is also scaled by 2 and so the 2 disappears. Now the Laplace
mechanism and the Exponential Mechanism have the same form.
Private MLE We are interested in reporting the parameters of a machine learning
model in a way that preserves the privacy of the dataset. Maximum likelihood is one
way to fit the model parameters, which embodies the intuition that the parameters which
are made the most likely by the data should be chosen. It is thus very natural to consider
the likelihood function as the quality score function of the exponential mechanism;
even further, because of the exponent in the exponential mechanism, it makes sense to
consider the log-likelihood instead.
If we use the negative log likelihood (  logL(q)) as the distance function, we could
think of z as ranging over the possible model parameters q. Here e = 1/T (the inverse
temperature). When e goes to 0 (through positive values) we tend to pick a random
sample z and report that as the output of the privacy mechanism. When e goes to infinity,
PX(z) will pick the q for which the likelihood is the highest, i.e. the MLE. We can
think of the exponential mechanism with a fixed e < 1 as sampling from a more diffuse
version of the true posterior with an uninformative prior and thus finding a value close
to the true maximum likelihood.
Sensitivity of the NLL In order to use the exponential mechanism, we need to find
the sensitivity of the distance function. When we use the NLL as the metric, this means
we need to find D, such that:
max
X⇠X 0
k logL(q|X)  logL(q|X 0)k1  D. (2.42)
However, in general, L(q) 2 [0,•) for real-valued data and so logL(q) 2 ( •,•).
When data is discrete, L(q) 2 [0,1] for real-valued data and so logL(q) 2 ( •,0]. In
both cases the sensitivity is unbounded.
Thresholding Because the sensitivity of the likelihood is unbounded, it is impossi-
ble to use the NLL as the distance function of the exponential mechanism without any
modification. The modification Williams and McSherry (2010) propose is to set the
sensitivity to 1, i.e.
D = 1.
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For the negative log likelihood distance function, the above translates as follows:
k logL(q|X)  logL(q|X 0)k1  1 (2.43)
or (2.44)
 1 logL(q|X)  logL(q|X 0) 1. (2.45)
The likelihood of the parameters is the product of the probabilities of individual exam-
ples, so the log likelihood is a sum of the log likelihoods of each example. The two
datasets X and X 0 are neighbouring. Let the only extra example in X 0 be called (x,y).











 1 log p(x,y|q) 1, (2.47)
which states that the magnitude of the log likelihood of every sample is bounded by 1.
Exponentiating,
e 1  p(x,y|q) e. (2.48)
To summarize, not all distance functions have bounded sensitivity. When confronted
with unboundedness, one solution for distance functions which can be factorized is to
bound each factor. McSherry and Talwar (2007) refers to this procedure as clamping.
The negative log likelihood makes a natural distance function to be used with
the exponential mechanism. As a quality function, the likelihood has to be clamped,
meaning that certain inputs get 0 probability. For distributions with thicker tails, the
clamping procedure results in significant loss of information and good results are not
guaranteed.
2.3 Properties
Differential privacy has a number of attractive properties. Apart from being a formal,
provable guarantee, it is the only formulation which allows for the privacy cost to be
explicit. Furthermore, it has nice composition properties, which allow datasets with
different privacy restrictions to be computed on and the resulting algorithms to be
combined. Applications of these theorems are seen throughout this work, but a few
basic examples can be referred to in Section 2.3.5. For the proofs, please refer to
(Dwork and Roth, 2014).
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2.3.1 Invariance to Post Processing
The following theorem states that the output of a differentially private mechanism can
be processed further while keeping the e-differential privacy guarantee. This property
of all differentially private mechanisms is useful, because a mechanism’s output can be
used for purposes beyond the original intent of the private mechanism.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let P = {PX : X 2 X } be an e-differentially private algorithm and
f : A ! A 0. Then f  P : X ! A 0 is e-differentially private.
2.3.2 Sequential Composition
The following theorem applies whenever a dataset is processed multiple times by private
algorithms.
Theorem 2.3.2. Let P1, . . . ,Pn be n independent mechanisms whose privacy guar-
antees are e1, . . . ,en-differential privacy, respectively. Then any function g of them:






The following theorem applies whenever disjoint sets of data are input into a differen-
tially private algorithm.
Theorem 2.3.3. Let P1, . . . ,Pn be n independent mechanisms whose privacy guarantees
are e1, . . . ,en-differential privacy, respectively. If the input datasets to these mechanisms
are disjoint subsets of the private database then any function g(P1, . . . ,Pn) is (maxi ei)-
differentially private.
2.3.4 Group Privacy
The definition of differential privacy could be used to protect group privacy, instead
of privacy of individual rows. In more detail, an adversary with arbitrary auxiliary
information cannot know if c particular participants submitted their information. This
can be achieved because if c items change, the ratio of probabilities is bounded by
exp(ec) instead of exp(e).
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2.3.5 Examples
Example with the total sensitivity We now take a look at releasing a two-dimensional
vector z = P (X), where each dimension has noise added independently and the scale
of the noise is the same. z was sampled from the Laplace mechanism described above,
assuming independent elements. In this, we use the total sensitivity in each direction of
the noise.
z = (z1,z2)T ⇠ (Laplace(d1,D/e),Laplace(d2,D/e)). (2.49)
In this case
PX(z) = PX(z1)PX(z2). (2.50)
The private mechanism P releasing the vector z as above is e-differentially private.
Proof. We have to prove that
PX(z 2 Z)
PX 0(z 2 Z)
 exp(e) (2.51)
for a subset Z of RD.

















Now we have to integrate to get probabilities. For any subset Z of RD,






eedPX 0(z) = ee
Z
Z
dPX 0(z) = eePX 0(z 2 Z), (2.55)
so the ratio of the cdfs is bounded as well.
Example with different e in each direction If we assume the privacy parameter is
different for each direction, we can again obtain differential privacy. The directions are
still independent and we again use the total sensitivity in each direction.
z = (z1,z2)T ⇠ (Laplace(d1,D/e1),Laplace(d2,D/e2)). (2.56)
































where e = max(e1,e2). We complete the proof as before.
This example shows why e-differential privacy is not particularly well suited to
problems which involve several datasets with different privacy restrictions. Even though
we would like to be able to provide different levels of privacy to the different datasets,
e-differential privacy can only provide a final guarantee of e, effectively ignoring the
granularity of the requirements. Based on this intuition, Appendix B provides an initial
investigation into the combination of models with different privacy levels.
Example with the partial sensitivities We now look at what happens if we add
noise from two different Laplace distributions.
z = (z1,z2)T ⇠ (Laplace(d1,D1/e1),Laplace(d2,D2/e2)). (2.61)
Two dependent numbers z1 and z2 released with guarantees e1 and e2, respectively,









 exp(e1)exp(e2) exp(e1 + e2), (2.62)
where X 0 is the neighboring dataset.
To sum up, if we add noise to each direction using the sensitivity of this direction
only, we have to add up the epsilons. If we use the total sensitivity for each direction,
we can just use the maximum e.
Let’s say we are releasing a vector and the total sensitivity of the mechanism is D.
Let’s also assume that the total budget we have is e. According to the above, we could
choose between
z = (z1, . . . ,zD)T ⇠ (Laplace(d1,D1/e1), . . . ,Laplace(dD,D2/eD)) (2.63)
and
z = (z1, . . . ,zD)T ⇠ (Laplace(d1,D/e), . . . ,Laplace(dD,D/e)), (2.64)
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where D = D1 + · · ·+DD and e = e1 + · · ·+ eD.
Consider a scenario where the sensitivity D is the number of dimensions and the
sensitivity Dd in each direction is 1. This is a typical scenario in counting queries, where
each dimension of the output of the mechanism in question is a count. In addition, let
the total privacy budget be split equally amongst all dimensions, such that ed = e/D. It













This fact will prove useful in the design of the private Naive Bayes classifier.
2.4 Private Machine Learning Strategies
The resilience of private mechanism outputs to post-processing allows several alternative
approaches for creating differentially private applications.
Input perturbation Consider representing a dataset as a collection of vectors, real-
valued or otherwise. The dataset can be protected by adding privacy related noise
according to a certain privacy level. Any computation using the protected dataset,
private or otherwise, will guarantee the differential privacy of the original dataset
(Theorem 2.3.1 on page 19). This is the basis for the input perturbation approach.
Probably the most straightforward technique for private computation, it protects the
dataset before it does any computation with it.
In more detail, each D-dimensional entry x in the dataset is obtained by
x̃ = x+b (2.65)








where D is the maximum change in the l1-norm of x due to its substitution with a
different vector. Due to the properties of the l1-norm, each element of b can be
sampled independently from a Laplace distribution scaled by the maximum change in
the corresponding direction. Applying 2.65 to all entries in the dataset produces an
e-differentially private approximation to the original dataset.
Output perturbation Analogously to the above method, one can perturb the output
of an algorithm to preserve privacy. For example, to produce a private version of the
MLE for logistic regression, one would train logistic regression as usual; then sample
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a noise vector with the same dimensionality and return the original estimate plus the
noise vector. Indeed this is one approach taken by (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) in designing
a private logistic regression classifier. For example, if the output of a non-private
algorithm is d, instead of it, we could release
d̃ = d+b, (2.67)
where b is drawn from the Laplace distribution with zero mean and scale parameter D/e
and qX is the output of the non-private equivalent of PX . Noise is sampled independently
in each dimension. Alternatively, we could use a more general p-norm, as discussed
before.
Depending on the domain of application, it is possible that the output’s sensitivity
is unbounded, in which case it has to be thresholded or otherwise bound to a certain
interval.
Objective perturbation Naturally, noise can be added at any intermediate step of
an algorithm, as long as the sensitivity of the vector reported is used. One example of
this is the objective perturbation method, where a noise vector is applied to the objective
function prior to optimization, as will be described in great detail in Chapter 3.
Choosing a strategy The choice of strategy is not always easy, but should be guided
by the principle of least information (Dwork and Roth, 2014). The principle states that
a private mechanism should output the least possible amount of information required
to complete a task. Intuitively, this is correct because the less information an output
carries, the less it will have to be perturbed to preserve privacy.
Usually, the private mechanism takes in some data and computes some statistic
from it. Taking into account the principle of least information (Dwork and Roth, 2014),
it is unlikely that perturbing the data itself is the optimal choice. The data can carry
more information than necessary to compute the output of interest, and it is usually
high-dimensional and of different types. However, input perturbation could be useful in
situations where the data is used in more than one ways, or whenever the data analyst
wants to use a non-private algorithm.
Following the principle of least information, it is the output perturbation that seems
like the optimal strategy and it may well be in many cases. Mechanisms take in a lot of
data, make complex computations on it, but often output a vector whose sensitivity is
much smaller than that of the intermediate steps.
Previous research (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012) has suggested that
objective perturbation may perform better than output perturbation on “nice data”. In
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their example, these are datasets for which the loss function is strongly convex in a
neighborhood of its minimizer, the objective perturbation has better error guarantees
than in the worst-case. Some experiments have shown a slight advantage for objective
perturbation, but more experiments are needed to confirm or deny the observable gains
in practice.
Sample-and-aggregate framework The sample-and-aggregate framework (Nissim
et al., 2007) is a generic technique for designing private algorithms. It is most useful
when the function of interest has difficult to bound or analyze global sensitivity, but is
believed to be well-behaved in practice. This framework is particularly useful when the
function can be accurately estimated on a small sample set.
The sample-and-aggregate method works as follows. First the dataset is partitioned
into several blocks of equal size. Next, the function of interest is computed inde-
pendently on each block exactly, without noise. The intermediate outcomes are then
combined via a differentially private aggregation mechanism, typically a mean or a
median. The sensitivity of the aggregation function is used, and this is low, since only
one of the blocks will be changed as a result of adding one adding one new entry to
the original dataset. Some example applications of this framework include (Chaudhuri
et al., 2012) and (Czerniak and Zarzycki, 2003).
2.5 Existing Machine Learning Applications
This thesis is concerned with extending the applications of differential privacy to
machine learning. Some background on the terminology used in this thesis and in the
wider literature is in order.
A machine learning algorithm takes as input a set of samples or examples, called
a training set, and builds a model which captures knowledge about the underlying
distribution of the data. The learned model can be used to make predictions or decisions
about newly seen data.
Often, when discussing the privacy of a dataset, we are concerned with the privacy
of the individuals whose data is in the dataset. Usually, there is one entry (sample)
per person in a dataset, which is why the literature talks about individuals rather
than samples. The set of all possible samples is called the sample space and the
dimensionality of the sample space refers to the number of variables (features) each
sample has.
Machine learning is divided into two main types: predictive or supervised and
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unsupervised (Murphy, 2012). In supervised learning the goal is to learn a mapping
from inputs x to outputs y, given a training set of N input-output pairs X = {(xn,yn)}Nn=1.
The features of x can be categorical or numerical, and y can be categorical or real-valued.
When y is categorical, the problem is known as classification; when y is real-valued, as
regression. In unsupervised learning, the training set consists only of inputs {(xn)}Nn=1
and the goal is to find interesting patterns in the data.
This work will focus on binary classification, as there are established well understood
machine learning algorithms which have numerous real-world applications. Before
we pursue the goal of practical binary classifiers, we review some of the existing
privacy-preserving machine learning literature.
2.5.1 Evaluation criteria
To evaluate the quality of a differentially private model, it is necessary to compare
against a “true model”. In the literature, the true model is usually taken to be the model
learned by a non-private fitting procedure on the training data.
Having established the true model, we have to measure the distance between it and
the private model. A number of works (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; 0002 et al., 2012; 0002
and Thakurta, 2013) take the distance between the private and non-private model to be
the difference in their test accuracy, i.e. the proportion of correctly predicted labels on
previously unseen data. Other works (Dwork and Lei, 2009; Chaudhuri et al., 2012;
Lei, 2011) compare the distance between the model parameters learned by the two
models. We have used both of these techniques, focusing on the difference in accuracies
in experiments with real datasets, and investigating differences in parameter values in
diagnosing bad performance.
Having defined a distance measure between the true and the private model, some
works, such as (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Blum et al., 2013), provide convergence rate
guarantees in terms of (a,b)-usefulness (Blum et al., 2008). The output of a private
mechanism is (a,b)-useful if with probability 1 b the difference between it and the
true output is less than a. Although a useful notion, in this work we prefer comparisons
based on empirical performance, rather than theoretical guarantees.
2.5.2 Differentially private supervised learning
Vaidya et al. (2013) offer a differentially private Naive Bayes classifier for numerical
and categorical features. They use the Laplace mechanism and compute the sensitivity
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of the mechanism output. We defer further discussion of this paper to Chapter 3.
Differentially private logistic regression classifiers have been developed by (Chaud-
huri and Monteleoni, 2008; Chaudhuri et al., 2011) and (Zhang et al., 2012). Chaudhuri
and Monteleoni (2008); Chaudhuri et al. (2011) propose two methods for private logistic
regression. The first approach is to perturb the model parameters learned via non-private
logistic regression. As previously described, this is the output perturbation method,
which adds noise from a symmetric distribution. Further details on output perturbation
are available in Chapter 4. The second approach presented in (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) is
objective perturbation. It adds noise from the same parametric family of distributions,
but perturbs the objective function before it is optimized. Detailed explanation of this
approach is deferred to Chapter 4. Output perturbation requires fewer assumptions than
objective perturbation. Under these assumptions, namely strong convexity, differen-
tiability, and boundedness of the sample space, which allow both techniques to apply,
(Chaudhuri et al., 2011) shows that the worst-case theoretical guarantees of the two
methods are very similar.
The output and objective perturbation do not scale well with the dimensionality of
the data. Kifer et al. (2012) improve the objective perturbation technique by relaxing the
privacy guarantee to (e,d)-differential privacy. Furthermore, the relaxation allows the
use of objective perturbation for convex programs like the Lasso, where the regularizer
is the l1-norm.
Zhang et al. (2012) offer a different perspective on differentially private logistic
regression. The authors’ approach is still from an objective perturbation viewpoint,
however, they manage to avoid the sensitivity analysis on the original objective by a
polynomial representation of it. In order for the optimization to succeed, the polynomial
needs to have bounded coefficients. For logistic regression, this is achieved by creating
a quadratic Taylor expansion of the objective around 0:
J(q)⇡ qT Mq+aq+b. (2.68)
Differential privacy is then achieved through the perturbation of the coefficients of
Equation 2.68. The sensitivity is found to be twice the total sum of the absolute values
of the approximation coefficients and noise is sampled from the Laplace distribution
with scale the sensitivity over the privacy parameter. Injecting such noise into the
coefficients of the objective function may render the objective unbounded. This is
corrected by adding a constant regularization term to make
J(q)⇡ qT (M+lI)q+aq+b. (2.69)
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In contrast to the objective perturbation method of (Chaudhuri et al., 2011), which adds
noise only to the linear term, the functional mechanism perturbs the quadratic term
as well, totalling in O(D2) noised terms. The error surface is both shifted and scaled.
Experiments with the functional mechanism, detailed in Appendix B, confirmed that it
scales less well with the dimensionality than the objective perturbation method.
Various other machine learning algorithms have been explored under the differential
privacy constraint. Privacy-preserving support vector machines have been detailed in
Rubinstein et al. (2009); Chaudhuri et al. (2011); private treatment of decision trees is
presented in (Jagannathan et al., 2012; Friedman and Schuster, 2010); private online
learning is discussed in (Guha Thakurta and Smith, 2013; Jain et al., 2011). Further
review of differentially private machine learning algorithms is available in (Ji et al.,
2014).
2.5.3 Cross-validation
(Chaudhuri and Vinterbo, 2013a) design a differentially-private cross validation proce-
dure for training algorithms and performance measures which obey a certain stability
condition. They arrive at a notion called (b1,b2,d)-stability, which holds if the per-
formance measure does not change very much when one person’s private value in the
training or validation set changes, when the same random bits are used in the algorithm.
Moreover, the proposed method only works on differentiable penalty functions, such as
the l2-penalty (the standard ridge regression cost function).
The algorithm learns several models, each with a1-differential privacy, for all
possible values of the hyper-parameter. Next, one of these outputs is chosen by an a2-
differentially private mechanism using a validation score. The authors use a procedure
called exponential variables, but the exponential mechanism is similarly applicable.
Finally, the chosen hyper-parameter and the training data is used to retrain and get the
final output. The total privacy guarantee of their algorithm is (a1 +a2,d)-differential
privacy. (Chaudhuri and Vinterbo, 2013a) is extended in (Wang et al., 2009) to apply to
any convex penalty function, including elastic-net and lasso penalties.
In this work, cross-validation is performed in a non-private manner to aid experi-
mentation. However, to formally guarantee e-differential privacy, cross-validation must
be done using a valid private mechanism. We suggest using the method described above,
but also encourage future work on the subject.
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2.6 Useful definitions
Here are listed definitions, occurring frequently in the rest of this work.
Definition 2.6.1. The mutual information of two discrete random variables X and Y is
defined as:










where p(x,y) is the joint probability distribution function of X and Y , and p(x) and p(y)
are the marginal probability distribution functions of X and Y respectively.
In this work the mutual information will be used in the context of feature selection.
In particular, we will often compute the mutual information between a feature and a
class label. Most of the features we talk about are binary and the problems we look at
are two-class. For binary variables the above formula can be rewritten as follows:












where pc = p(y = c), qdc = p(xd = 1|y = c), and qd = p(xd = 1) = Âc pcqdc. In this
work the logarithm in the definition is base 2.
Definition 2.6.2. In experiments we often return to the majority baseline of a dataset.
The majority baseline of a set is the proportion of samples in the most frequently
occurring class of the dataset.
2.7 Looking ahead
The differentially private mechanisms detailed here have promising theoretical guar-
antees: they are approximately utility-maximizing, for a certain definition of utility,
asymptotically equivalent to their non-private counterparts, and computationally effi-
cient. Although theoretical work is abundant and our understanding of the workings
of these private mechanisms is good, more evidence is needed of their practical utility.
The few applications of differentially private machine learning algorithms (Erlich and
Narayanan, 2013) fail to convincingly make the case for the widespread adoption of dif-
ferential privacy amongst data science practitioners. More often than not, the argument
has been that differential privacy should be used because it is the best privacy guarantee
in existence. The goal of this work is to begin to show the possibility of useful results
from a differentially private classifier in a wide variety of realistic settings.
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In the following chapter, the Laplace mechanism is used to create a private Naive
Bayes classifier, which is then evaluated on real-world datasets. The results are encour-
aging, although on high-dimensionality datasets additional techniques are needed to
boost performance.
Chapter 3
Differentially Private Naive Bayes
3.1 Motivation
High-dimensional data is omnipresent in the real world and has inspired considerable
research effort in the machine learning community. The challenges arising in the
analysis of high-dimensional datasets are even more pronounced in private algorithms:
privacy-related perturbation significantly reduces the signal from the data. In settings
where sensitive data is already scarce, successful differentially private algorithms need
to be extremely statistically efficient.
Naive Bayes classifiers are one of the oldest and simplest to train probabilistic
models. Due to the strong independence assumption between features, they scale
well with dimensionality. The maximum likelihood estimate for Naive Bayes reduces
to counting queries to a dataset. Counting queries are the most straightforward for
differential privacy, because they have a constant sensitivity with respect to the number
of samples in the dataset. In addition, counting queries do not require any additional
computation apart from counting, they comply with the principle of “information
minimization” (Dwork and Roth, 2014). Thus, Naive Bayes is the best candidate in the
search for an effective, highly-scalable differentially private classifier.
Furthermore, maximum-likelihood training of a Naive Bayes classifier can be done
by evaluating a closed-form expression, computed in linear time. Efficiency undoubtedly
has practical implications for differentially private algorithms.
This chapter begins with some background on Naive Bayes classifiers. Next, we
develop a Naive Bayes classifier, prove its differential privacy guarantee, and evaluate
it empirically on several real world datasets. A dataset partitioning strategy is then
investigated, as a way to improve scalability with the number of features. Finally, a
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private dimensionality reduction technique based on feature selection is developed,
which successfully improves the performance of private Naive Bayes classifiers.
3.2 Background
Naive Bayes is a classifier, a machine learning system that given input features x of
dimensionality D, predicts an unknown class label y, usually a categorical variable.
It’s based on a generative model where the individual features xd , for each dimension
d, are assumed to be conditionally independent given the class label. Even though
the independence assumption is often inaccurate, for example in text classification
problems, naive Bayes classifiers have been useful in practice due to their scalability.
The naive assumption alleviates the curse of dimensionality, since the sample size does
not scale exponentially with the number of features. The class conditional density is a
product of the one-dimensional densities:




p(xd|y = c,qdc), (3.1)
where q are parameters learned from (x,y), the set of example pairs in the training set.
Our investigation will concern itself only with binary features. Real-valued and
categorical features are left as future work, but extensions are similar in nature. For
binary features:





where qdc is the probability that feature d occurs in class c.
3.2.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
One way to estimate the parameters q of a model is through maximum likelihood
training, i.e. selecting the set of parameters which maximize the likelihood given
the data. Naive Bayes is attractive because the maximum likelihood training can be
performed by evaluating a closed-form expression in linear time, as opposed to the
iterative approach necessary for many other types of classifiers.
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Taking the log,





where p(xd|qdc) =Cat(xd|qdc) for categorical features or p(xd|qdc) = Ber(xd|qdc) for
Bernoulli features. Thus the log likelihood of the model parameters given all training
examples is:


















where all qdc’s sum to 1 and Ndc is the number of times this feature is on in this class.
Having built a class conditional model using the probability of seeing each feature,
given the document class, we are ready to estimate the model parameters using maxi-
mum likelihood. We only state the results for Bernoulli distributed qdcs. The maximum
likelihood estimate for the class probabilities is p̄ = NcN , i.e. the number of documents
of class c over the total number of documents; and for the probability of each class
containing each feature, q̄dc = NdcNc , i.e. the number of documents in class c that feature
d turns up in over the number of documents in class c.
The problem with maximum likelihood training is that it encourages the model
parameters to overfit the data (Murphy, 2012). A solution to overfitting is to place a
prior probability on the model parameters, which quantifies our beliefs about them









where p⇠ Dir(a) and qdc ⇠ Beta(b0,b1). Often a = 1 and b = 1, which is referred to
as add-one or Laplace smoothing.
Combining the factored prior with the factored likelihood gives a factored posterior
of the model parameters given the data. To compute the posterior probability of the
model parameters given the data, we only need to update the prior counts with the
empirical counts form the likelihood. Alternatively, we can think of adding a prior as
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where a0 = Âc ac and a’s and b’s are fake counts. In this work we use add-one
smoothing and talk about pseudo counts.
When predicting the class of a new sample x⇤, we are interested in the posterior
probability of a class given the training data, or the posterior predictive density. In the
case of Naive Bayes this can be obtained by
p(y = c|x⇤,X) µ p̄c ’
d
(q̄dc)I(xd=1)(1  q̄dc)I(xd=0), (3.10)
where q̄dc and p̄ic are estimated as above. We can then select the class c which has the
highest posterior probability. When all we want to infer are class labels we do not need
to compute the normalization constant, since it is the same for all classes.
3.2.2 Designing private Naive Bayes classifiers
To develop a private Naive Bayes classifier, we go through the usual steps involved in
private mechanism creation. First, the most appropriate mechanism is chosen, depending
on the type of the output - Laplace for numeric and the Exponential Mechanism for
categorical, or whenever more flexibility is required in the quality score function
definition.
Next, a metric on the output space of the algorithm has to be chosen, which specifies
how good a particular output is, given each input to the algorithm. Importantly, this
needs to be a low-sensitivity function; otherwise accuracy will suffer as result of too
much noise.
All private mechanisms sample from a distribution on this output space which
depends on the sensitivity of the metric function and the privacy parameter. Depending
on whether the application permits it, several values for the privacy parameter should
be experimented with, until a satisfactory trade-off is found between the performance
of the private algorithm and the privacy level.
The final step of the design of private Naive Bayes is the choice of perturbation strat-
egy. Input perturbation, i.e. adding noise to the data itself, has been shown (Chaudhuri
et al., 2011) to often perform worse than output perturbation. As far as Naive Bayes is
considered, the objective perturbation method is ill-fitting: the model parameters that
maximize the likelihood can be found analytically and there is no need to optimize a
noisy objective function. Therefore the output perturbation is the method of choice for
Naive Bayes classifiers.
The first approach to designing a private Naive Bayes classifier is to use the Laplace
mechanism and Manhattan distance metric. An alternative approach is to consider
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the negative (log) likelihood function as the distance metric. A metric based on the
likelihood is intuitively appropriate, since it is a measure of the “goodness” of the model
parameters and shows how well these parameters explain the data at hand. We detail
the first approach and leave the second for future work.
3.3 Private Bernoulli Naive Bayes using the Laplace Mech-
anism
This section details the use of the Laplace mechanism to release a noisy maximum a
posteriori estimate of a private naive Bayes classifier.
Distance metric We quantify the usefulness of possible outputs of the private
mechanism by measuring the Manhattan distance between them and the true (best)
possible output. Measuring the quality of the noisy output parameters, this metric
is simply the l1-distance between the true parameter vector and the noisy released
parameter vector:
d(X , q̃) = kq  q̃k1. (3.11)
3.3.1 Output
Setup and notation The standard Naive Bayes algorithm returns O(DC) parameters,
linear in the dimensionality of the data. The private Naive Bayes mechanism described
here will release a noisy estimate of the these. We denote the noisy parameters by q̃dc,
and interpret them as the noisy proportions of times each feature is turned on in each
class. A noisy vector of class probabilities, p̃, is also released. Altogether,





q̃(1)11 . . . q̃
(1)
D1
... . . .
...





For brevity, we denote with q̃ the vector that contains all of the above, i.e. q̃ = (q̃, p̃).
In the non-private setting, the MLE parameters are qdc = NdcNc and pc =
Nc
N . In the private
setting our differentially private algorithms will return noisy counts. Noisy estimates of
the parameters computed from these noisy parameters will satisfy the same differential
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privacy guarantee as the algorithm releasing the counts (Theorem 2.3.1., p16). The
noisy counts are denoted as follows:





Ñ(1)11 . . . Ñ
(1)
D1
... . . .
...





Sensitivity When analyzing a private mechanism it is always necessary to quantify
its sensitivity to changes in the input. Sensitivity is defined as the maximum change
in the output of a an algorithm as a result of adding a new example in the dataset (see
Definitions 2.1.1 and 2.10, p. 7 and p. 9, respectively).
With respect to private Naive Bayes classification, computing the sensitivity means
quantifying the maximum change in the released model parameters given the addition
of one new training sample. The distance metric for the private Naive Bayes mechanism
is the Manhattan distance.
With the addition of one new example, each column of Ñ will increase by at most 1,
since the new example belongs to only one of the classes. In total, Ñ will increase by
at most D in the 1-norm. M̃ will increase by at most 1, since we’ve added an example
belonging to only one of the Nc’s. Therefore, (Ñ ,M̃)’s 1-norm will change by at most
D+ 1, making the sensitivity of the Manhattan distance metric on this output space
D+1.
Releasing off-counts Consider releasing a vector (N (1),N (0)) which contains the
number of times a feature is on as well as the number of times a feature is off, respec-








11 . . . Ñ
(0)
D1
... . . .
...
... . . .
...









Improved sensitivity Consider again the change in sensitivity due to the addition
of one example. In the matrix above, on each row we have the counts for one class. The
first half of the row has the on-counts and the second - the off-counts. Only one row in
this matrix will change as a result of a new example. Moreover, the row can change
by at most D, since either an on- or an off-count will be updated. Thus the maximum
change in the value of the distance metric as a result of adding a new sample is D. The
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difference with the previous sensitivity is negligible for large D, but might provide for
better results in very low-dimensional problems.
3.3.2 Algorithm








and added to each direction of Ñ independently. The scale of the noise added to each
dimension is De . The algorithm is presented in 1.
To get an appreciation for the magnitude of the noise, the standard deviation of this
Laplace distribution for e = 0.1 and D = 600 is
p
2De ⇡ 8500; for e = 1 and D = 600
it’s ⇡ 850. The algorithm reports counts, i.e. the number of times each feature is on in
each class. This means the output of the algorithm is bounded by the number of samples
available to it. For good accuracy, of the size of the dataset is of the order of 8500 or
less, the results of the private mechanism will be completely obliterated by the noise.
Thus, for e = 0.1, the size of the dataset should be much bigger than 8500. Clearly, a
significant amount of data will be necessary to achieve satisfactory results with a high
level of privacy for a dataset with many features.
Algorithm 1 Private Bernoulli Naive Bayes MLE based on the Laplace mechanism
1: procedure PRIVATENBFIT1(X ,y, pseudoCount,e) . The design matrix
X, the vector of target values y, the effective sample size of the prior, the privacy
parameter e
2: D = D
3: tlower = De log(2(1 0.65))
4: for c = 1 : C do . For each class
5: Xc = all samples in class c
6: N (1) = the number of times each feature is turned on in c
7: Ñ (1) = max(N (1) +Laplace(0,D/e), tlower)
8: N (0) = the number of times each feature is turn off in c
9: Ñ (0) = max(N (0) +Laplace(0,D/e), tlower)
10: q̃(c, :) = [ Ñ
(1)
+ pseudoCount
Ñ (1)+Ñ (0)+ 2pseudoCount
, q
(0)+ pseudoCount
Ñ (1)+Ñ (0)+ 2pseudoCount
]
Thresholding to ensure consistency Since the Laplace is a double-sided distribu-
tion, it is possible that the counts become negative. This is problematic because we
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estimate probabilities using counts and probabilities need to be non-negative. We could
force the counts to be non-negative by thresholding them to 0 or 1 and this would ensure
that the released probabilities are defined. However, consider what happens to the
counts when some features are sparse and privacy is stringent. When the added noise
is big in comparison with the counts for a sparse feature, the signal in the data will be
overwhelmed. Such feature will seem deceivingly informative and using it will degrade
performance. We address both of these issues by proposing a thresholding heuristic,
which we now place into context with the following concrete example.
Consider a scenario in which the count for a feature in one class is 200 and the
count for that feature in the second class is 100. Let the dimensionality of this two-class
problem be 100. An 0.1-differentially private mechanism could sample a noise vector
( 150,900). The new counts will be (50,1000), making the likelihood of the second
class 20 times bigger than the likelihood of the first class. To avoid this issue, we need
to ensure that the noise is smaller in magnitude than the counts.
We propose that the perturbed counts are thresholded to a constant of the order of
the noise. In particular, the noised counts are thresholded such that the threshold is
bigger than the noise added most of the time. It is important to note that thresholding
in this way may result in ignoring rare but informative features, because their counts
may not be large enough even in the presence of a lot of data. Thus, several thresholds
should be experimented with, but based on our experiments, the 65% percentile of the




For example, when e = 1 and D = 600 this is 214 and when e = 0.1, it’s 2140.
Releasing the class probabilities Releasing the class probabilities p is straightfor-
ward, since given the released M , it is a post-processing step. In particular, the count
for a class is given by the sum of the number of times each feature is off and on in this
class. Because of the noise, this summation results in different counts for each feature.
To obtain only one count per class, we take the mean of all sums. Taking the mean
ensures that noise in the positive and negative direction cancels out on average and we
get close to the true class count.
3.3.3 Privacy proof and analysis of the algorithm
Privacy guarantee
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Theorem 3.3.1. Algorithm 1 satisfies e-differential privacy.
Proof. Previously, we showed that the sensitivity of the Manhattan distance metric
employed by this algorithm is D, the dimensionality of the data:
D = D. (3.16)
The algorithm releases (Ñ (1), Ñ (0)) by sampling a Laplace distribution centered at the








The computation of (Ñ (1), Ñ (0)) is e-differentially private, following from Theorem
2.2.1. In order to release q̃(c, :) no additional noise needs to be added, as per Theorem
2.3.1. This completes the proof.
Scaling with the amount of data The uncertainty in the estimate of the model
parameters resulting from the privacy restriction can be reduced with additional data.
Indeed, since the sensitivity is equal to the dimensionality, the amount of additional
data required by the algorithm to achieve good accuracy scales linearly with the dimen-
sionality as well. The sensitivity of the algorithm, and thus the amount of noise, are
constant with respect to the dataset size N. In low-dimensionality settings, it is therefore
reasonable to expect that when N grows the noise levels will be small compared with
the counts, achieving good performance. In high-dimensionality settings, it may not be
possible to obtain the necessary amount of extra data, since when features are sparse
counts can still be too small compared with the amount of noise.
The limiting behavior of Algorithm 1 when N goes to infinity is desirable - the
parameters will not be perturbed. This is achieved by reporting q jc = (Non +a)/(N +
a + b), where a and b are the pseudo counts for the positive and negative class,
respectively.
Limiting behaviour with epsilon As the privacy parameter is relaxed to infinity,
Algorithm 1 will add noise with 0 variance, i.e. the noise disappears.
3.3.4 Empirical analysis of the algorithm
Experiments are performed using the UCI datasets summarized in Table 3.1, detailed
further in Appendix A. If necessary, each dataset has been preprocessed to make all
features binary.
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Name Train set size Test set size Number of features Majority baseline
XWindowsDoc 900 900 600 50%
Mushrooms 5687 2437 112 52%
Adult 32561 16281 123 76%
Newsgroup 5687 2437 100 57%
Newsgroup2 4663 1998 100 81%
Table 3.1: Table showing the details of the preprocessed UCI datasets used for experi-
ments. The majority baseline is the proportion of the bigger class in the dataset, i.e. the
size of the bigger class over the size of the whole dataset.
Unless otherwise stated, the privacy parameter epsilon is 0.1. The randomized
procedure is repeated 10 times and the average accuracies are reported with standard
errors.
Sensitivity to the threshold As discussed earlier, thresholding was employed which
ensures that parameters associated with features which are too rare will be ignored. It is
important to see how this thresholding procedure affects the accuracy of the algorithm,
since some of these rare features may be very informative prior to perturbation.
We conduct several experiments with the following thresholds: 0,1, log2/e,10,100
followed by the 65%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 95%, and 99% percentiles.
In figures 3.1a and 3.3a we show the accuracy of the algorithm on the XWindowsDoc
and Newsgroup1 dataset, respectively, as a function of the threshold. No significant
improvement in the accuracy is noticeable from using a different threshold. In Figure
3.2a we perform the same experiment on the Mushrooms dataset, where using a bigger
threshold can improve the accuracy of the private algorithm by roughly 5%.
Figures 3.1b, 3.2b and 3.3b show the mean number of features for which the noisy
count was thresholded. Thresholding a feature means it has the same value for all classes
and thus becomes irrelevant to the classification decision. For the Mushrooms and
Newsgroup1 datasets roughly 75% of the features were thresholded when the threshold
is the 65th percentile of the noise distribution. In the XWondowsDoc dataset more
features were thresholded, due to the larger number of sparse features in this dataset.
Figure 3.4 compares the mutual information, measured in bits, of features in the
three datasets. The Mushrooms dataset has a few features which are very informative in
contrast with the other two datasets, where the difference between the most and least
informative features is not as drastic. For some values of the threshold, the algorithm
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(a) Testing the sensitivity of Algorithm 1 to
the choice of threshold tlower. The accuracy
does not change significantly. The fifth point
corresponds to the 65% percentile.












































(b) The mean number of thresholded fea-
tures as a function of the threshold.
Figure 3.1: Thresholding effect on the XWindowsDoc dataset The mean number
of thresholded features corresponds to the number of features whose noisy counts
were thresholded averaged over all runs of the private procedure. Figure generated by
testThresholding.m.



















(a) Testing the sensitivity of the Algorithm 1
to the choice of threshold tlower. Increase
in accuracy results from choosing a smaller
threshold. The fifth point corresponds to the
65% percentile.









































(b) The mean number of thresholded fea-
tures as a function of the threshold.
Figure 3.2: Thresholding effect on the Mushrooms dataset The mean number of
thresholded features corresponds to the number of features whose noisy counts were
thresholded averaged over all runs of the private procedure. Figure generated by
testThresholding.m.
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(a) Testing the sensitivity of the Algorithm
1 to the choice of threshold tlower. Virtu-
ally no effect is noticeable on the accuracy.
The fifth point corresponds to the 65% per-
centile.







































(b) The mean number of thresholded fea-
tures as a function of the threshold.
Figure 3.3: Thresholding effect on the Newsgroup1 dataset The mean number of
thresholded features corresponds to the number of features whose noisy counts were
thresholded averaged over all runs of the private procedure. Figure generated by
testThresholding.m.
manages to find the features that seem useful, while ignoring the ones for which the
noise has trumped the signal. Figure 3.5 shows the mutual information, in bits, for
features in the Mushrooms and Newsgroup1 dataset together with whether a feature
was thresholded or not. We see that in the Mushrooms dataset a significant number
of the informative features are preserved, whereas in the Newsgroup1 dataset a bigger
proportion of the more informative features are thresholded and thus ignored. In the
Mushrooms dataset, frequent features were more informative compared with the two
other datasets. This allowed the thresholding procedure to ignore rare uninformative
features, which were only contributing noise to the learned classifier. Thresholding
could be useful in situations where there are a few rare uninformative features.
Different privacy settings This section investigates the privacy-accuracy trade-off
of Algorithm 1.
Figure 3.6a shows the results of using the private classifier with different values
of the privacy parameter e on the balanced XWindowsDoc dataset. The total number
of features for this dataset is 600 and the number of training samples is 900. An 0.1-
differentially private Naive Bayes classifier needs to add noise with standard deviation of
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Figure 3.4: MI for the top 100 informative features The mutual information, measured
in bits, for each feature in the XWindowsDoc, Mushrooms, and Newsgroup1 datasets,
sorted, on the original data. Figure generated by testThresholding.m.









































Figure 3.5: MI for each feature with thresholding information The mutual infor-
mation, measure in bits, of the original features as a function of the feature num-
ber for one run of the algorithm. Crosses show that the feature was thresholded by
tlower = De log(2(1 0.65)). In the Mushrooms dataset the more informative features
were also more frequent and thus not thresholded too often. Figure generated by
testThresholding.m.
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(a) XWindowsDoc The performance has
suffered significantly due to the addition of
noise and only beats the baseline for rela-
tively big e’s. The experiment uses all 600
features and all 900 training samples. Fig-
ure generated by privateNBLaplaceNoiseV-
ersion1.m.























(b) Mushrooms Reasonable performance
could be obtained for privacy levels greater
than 1. The experiment uses all 112 fea-
tures and all 5687 training samples. Figure
generated by privateNBLaplaceNoiseVer-
sion1.m.
Figure 3.6: Scaling with e Average accuracy for different epsilons, for 20 runs of the
algorithm with a flat prior.
8500. Clearly, 900 samples are not enough to combat the stringent privacy requirements.
The result is a classifier which makes random guesses. The noise cannot be compensated
for and a lot more data is required for dimensionality as high as this.
Figure 3.6b shows the results of performing the same experiment on the Mushrooms
dataset. Here, there is more data and less features, so even for relatively strict privacy
requirements the algorithm can achieve good results. The increase in performance with
the relaxation is much steeper than in the small N big D problem above. The private
algorithm is indeed useful in scenarios where data is abundant, or the number of features
is relatively small.
Implications of the Laplace Mechanism Further insight into the performance of
private Naive Bayes can be gained from the sample complexity bound of the Laplace
Mechanism. We apply Theorem 2.2.2 to the XWindowsDoc dataset, with e = 0.1, 900
samples and 600 features. For a counting query with sensitivity 1, with probability







For datasets where features are sparse this is significant error capable of obscuring the
signal in the data.
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Scaling with the number of features As seen earlier, for small epsilons, the two
classifiers trained were akin to doing random guessing. We now look at how the number
of features affects the accuracy of Algorithm 1.
In the following experiments, features are ranked by their mutual information,
measured in bits, with the class. Figure 3.7 shows the accuracy as a function of the
number of features used, for the XWindowsDoc and Mushrooms datasets. On the
horizontal axis is the mutual information of the least informative feature used: reading
from right to left, the first result is the test accuracy of the classifier trained on the single
most informative feature. The number of features used increases from right to left.
For non-private Naive Bayes (Figure 3.7a, XWindowsDoc dataset) selecting a few
features can help increase accuracy by roughly 4%. For private Naive Bayes on the same
dataset (Figure 3.7b) feature selection can result in accuracy close to the non-private,
but using more than the first 7 or 8 features quickly degrades it quickly. In this figure,
we see for the first time a private algorithm that performs above the baseline on this
dataset. In Figure 3.7d, for the Mushrooms dataset, again the accuracy is improved by
using the first few features. However, this time the decline in accuracy as a result of
using more features is less steep, due to the bigger dataset size.
Privacy guarantee The above experiments show that using fewer features can dras-
tically improve performance even on relatively high-dimensional datasets. However, the
training procedure used is not e-differentially private, because it violates Theorem 2.3.2.
In particular, the feature selection step of sorting by mutual information does not pre-
serve privacy, since the true mutual informations were used. A natural next step is
private feature selection, which will be detailed in Section 3.5.
3.3.5 Relation to previous work
Differentially private Naive Bayes classifiers have previously been developed by Vaidya
et al. (2013). Similarly to our work, their algorithm uses the Manhattan distance
distance function and the perturbed version of the counts. Their fitting procedure,
however, differs in two ways. First, they report the class probabilities as follows
nc0j nc j +Lap(0,1), (3.18)
where nc j is the number of examples in class c j. With noise addition from Lap(0,1),
the e used to report the probability of one class is 1; for C classes this subprocedure
would be C-differentially private. Next, the number of times each feature appears in
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(a) Non-private version, XWindowDoc
dataset Using only the first few most im-
portant features can increase accuracy by
about 4%. Too many features, and the clas-
sifier overfits the data, as indicated by the
small training error and big test error.





















(b) Private version, XWindowsDoc
dataset e = 0.1; Using only the first few
features increases the accuracy to 80%.
When the number of features is increased,
both the training and testing error rapidly
increase.















(c) Non-private version, Mushrooms
dataset Using the first most informative fea-
tures achieves an increase of 3%.













(d) Private version, Mushrooms dataset
e = 0.1; Using only the first few features
increases the accuracy to 97%. When the
number of features is increased, both the
training and testing error increase.
Figure 3.7: Accuracy as a function of the number of features used Horizontal axis
shows the mutual information, measured in bits, of the least informative of the features
used. The dashed line shows the test accuracy of the classifier trained on all features,
circles and pluses show the train and test accuracy, respectively, for the specified number
of features.
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each class is reported as follows:
nk j = nk j +Lap(0,1/e). (3.19)
Summing up the privacy budget according to the composition theorems 2.3.3 and 2.3.2,
the total privacy budget used is De, where D is the number of dimensions. In total, the
privacy guarantee of this algorithm is De+C, as opposed to the claimed e. Instead,
in our work, the scale of the noise distribution depends on the dimensionality of the
dataset.
The second difference with our work is the way that negative counts and class
probabilities are handled. In their implementation noise is resampled until the perturbed
counts are non-negative. This is not a valid procedure, because the final distribution of
the noise will be different from what was intended.
Finally, they test the implemented algorithm on a number of UCI datasets. Un-
fortunately, they only tested large values of the privacy parameter, e > 1, whereas in
practice a smaller value of e is recommended. Their experiments fail to fully represent
the real spectrum of useful private levels. Not surprisingly, for these relatively large
values of the privacy parameter, their algorithm achieves good results on most datasets.
Interestingly, on the Adult dataset their algorithm only achieves baseline performance
even with values of e bigger than 1. The Adult dataset seems particularly difficult for
differentially private algorithms - even with the fairly relaxed privacy guarantee of their
algorithm, the results for this dataset are discouraging.
3.3.5.1 Conclusion
Datasets where the number of samples is smaller than (or similar to) the dimensionality
are common in the real world. As seen earlier, for high-dimensionality datasets, adding
noise with scale proportional to the dimensionality can amount to adding fake data
points on orders of magnitude greater than the available amount of data. So much fake
data can obliterate the true model parameters.
Could the situation be improved? We could reduce the original dimensionality of
the dataset, so that we have a lot more data than features. In this way we can hope to
have more real data than fake data and hence more reliable perturbed parameters.
Before we go on to private feature selection, we discuss an alternative training
procedure that could potentially improve the performance of the private Naive Bayes
classifier and does not require feature selection.
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3.4 Partitioning strategy
We propose a training strategy for private machine learning classifiers, where the
original dataset is partitioned such that each partition is used to train one of the model
parameters. For D model parameters, D separate private classifiers are obtained, each of
which is trained on a subset of the data of size N/D. Intuitively speaking, the strategy
exploits the fact that privacy noise is independent in each direction. Experiments with
this strategy show that it can improve private Naive Bayes’ performance in certain
situations.
3.4.1 Experiments
We evaluate the partitioning strategy against the standard training methodology. We
experiment with several datasets, including the XWindowsDoc, Mushrooms, and some
synthetic datasets. To allow us to investigate the partitioning strategy with increasing
amount of data, we have replaced the XWindowsDoc dataset with a synthetic proxy
dataset. In particular, we generate 3600 train and 3600 test samples by sampling from a
non-private Naive Bayes model trained on the original dataset. Similarly, we generate
two synthetic datasets by sampling from the following two Naive Bayes models:
qdense synthetic dataset =
"
. . . ⇡ 0.8 . . .




qsparse synthetic dataset =
"
. . . ⇡ 0.01 . . .
. . . ⇡ 0.03 . . .
#
,
where we have 2 classes and 300 features. The train set and the test set are both of size
3000, 30000, or 60000.
The setup for this experiment is as follows. The features for each dataset are sorted
by their mutual information with the class. Then a certain number of features, shown on
the horizontal line, is chosen. For each number of features, T , four classifiers are com-
pared. First, in yellow, is the private classifier obtained by splitting the original dataset
into T smaller datasets, training T separate one-feature models, and then combining
them into one T -dimensional vector of model parameters. In light green circles, is the
private classifier trained with all data with all features at the same time. In blue circles is
its non-private counterpart. Finally, in orange pluses, is the non-private classifier trained
by the partitioning strategy. Each marker shows the average accuracy over 50 runs of
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the randomized procedure together with the standard error. The dimensionality of the
large problem is gradually increased. The training set is constant size, so with more
features the number of samples per feature in the partitioning strategy gets smaller.
Results are shown in Figure 3.8. For the XWindowsDoc, Mushrooms and the
dense synthetic datasets, figures 3.8a, 3.8b and 3.8c, respectively, there is a noticeable
improvement in the accuracy of the private classifier resulting from partitioning. The
improvement is more noticeable for certain values of the dimensionality, because the
loss in generalization performance for that number of samples is less damaging than the
loss due to privacy.
For sparse datasets, figures 3.8d and 3.8e, using the partitioning strategy has a
negative effect on performance, for both the non-private and private settings. This is
due to the sparsity of the data: splitting results in even sparser features and more likely
to be incorrectly estimated.
Finally, Figure 3.8f presents a setting where there is a slight positive effect of
partitioning on a sparse dataset. In this setting, there is a lot of data per feature, but the
privacy restrictions are more severe.
In conclusion, the partitioning strategy can slightly benefit the performance of a
private classifier, as long as enough data is available to train for each feature separately.
For dense datasets less data is usually needed and partitioning may prove beneficial.
For sparse problems partitioning is less useful.
3.5 Differentially private feature selection
As shown previously, dimensionality reduction could be a viable option for improving
the performance of differentially private Naive Bayes on higher-dimensional datasets.
The problem which the above considerations have left unsolved, however, is differen-
tially private feature selection.
3.5.1 Input and output
A private feature selection algorithm takes as input the data allocated for feature
selection, a privacy parameter e, specifying how much of the privacy is allocated for
feature selection, and the number of features to be selected, T . The algorithm outputs
a vector which specifies which features are selected. This is a vector of length T of
integers in the range [1,D]. Here, we will prefer the one-hot-encoding, where the output






















(a) XWindowsDoc dataset proxy No pri-
vacy: partitioning makes no difference; pri-






















(b) Mushrooms dataset No privacy: de-























(c) Dense synthetic dataset of size 1000























(d) Sparse synthetic dataset of size 3000






















(e) Sparse synthetic dataset of size






















(f) Sparse synthetic dataset of size
60000, e = 0.01 . Questionable advantage
from partitioning.
Figure 3.8: Partitioning strategy In yellow, is the private classifier obtained by splitting
the original dataset, then training several one-feature models and combining them. In
light green circles, is the private classifier trained normally. In blue circles is its non-
private counterpart. Finally, in orange pluses, is the non-private classifier trained by the
partitioning strategy. Partitioning is more useful for dense datasets.
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is {0,1}D, i.e. a binary vector of length D.
There are two alternative ways in which the data and privacy budget can be used
when feature selection is performed prior to training. The first input option for feature
selection is to use all of the training data available, but dedicate only a portion of the
total privacy budget; the rest of the privacy budget and all of the training data is then
passed to the training procedure. The second option is to use a subset of the training
data and e equal to the total privacy budget; the rest of the data and the total e is then
passed to the training procedure.
Choosing the strategy to employ is problem dependent. It is suggested that domain
knowledge and information about the size of the available training set is used to make
this decision. In the presentation of feature selection algorithms it will be assumed that
this decision is made in advance. In the experiments, it will be specified what e and
data are used as needed.
3.5.2 Noisy variable ranking
The most basic approach to feature selection is variable ranking. It is often used
as auxiliary selection mechanism due to its scalability, simplicity, and satisfactory
empirical performance (Guyon and Elisseeff, 2003). Referred to as a filter method,
variable ranking is independent of the choice of classifier.
The general procedure for variable ranking is as follows. Using a certain scoring
function, computed from the values xnd of feature xd and yn, n = 1, . . . ,N. A high score
means that xd is a useful variable for prediction. Sorting the variables in decreasing
order of their score, the top T variables are selected for use in training a classifier.
Other common criteria for variable ranking are correlation, individual predictive
power (the performance of a classifier built using a single variable), and mutual infor-
mation. Due to its scalability, noisy variable ranking is a promising first step towards
effective private feature selection.
Distance metric As usual in the design of differentially private algorithms, we have
to select the score function and the distance metric on its output space. An important
decision also regards the stage of the algorithm at which the noise is added.
The score function quantifies the “goodness” of the output - in this case the use-
fulness of each feature. Since the mutual information is a common feature selection
criterion in the non-private setting, it is worth investigating as the quality score function
of a private feature selection algorithm. The distance metric on the output space will be
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the Manhattan distance.
3.5.2.1 Selecting features by fitting another model
A natural first attempt at noisy variable ranking is as shown in Algorithm 2. The
algorithm fits a private Naive Bayes model, then computes the mutual information of
each feature using the perturbed counts; then finally sorts the mutual informations and
reports the top T . Algorithm 2 adds noise in the beginning, as in input perturbation.
Algorithm 2 Noisy variable ranking by fitting another model
1: procedure SELECTFEATURES(X ,y,e,T )
2: q̃ = f itPrivateNB(X ,y,e)
3: Compute Ĩ(X ,y), a vector of length D
4: sorted = sort(Ĩ(X ,y))
return One-hot encoding of sorted(1 : T )
The algorithm is e differentially private, since f itPrivateNB is e-differentially
private and steps 3 and 4 are simply post-processing.
As already shown, fitting a private Naive Bayes model to high-dimensional data
is not straightforward unless abundant data is available. Moreover, only part of the
total privacy budget (or a subset of the training data) is available for selection. Thus,
this feature selection procedure is unlikely to be effective and a more privacy efficient
solution is needed for high-dimensional problems.
3.5.2.2 Releasing the mutual information
Instead of input perturbation, we now consider output perturbation - releasing perturbed
mutual informations, which have been computed using true counts. The algorithm is
shown in 3.
Algorithm 3 Noisy Variable Ranking by releasing I
1: procedure SELECTFEATURES(X ,y,e,T )
2: Compute I(X ,y), a vector of length D








4: Ĩ(X ,y) = I(X ,y)+Laplace(0,D/e)
5: sorted = sort(Ĩ(X ,y))
return One-hot encoding of sorted(1 : T )









(b) Adding one new sample and its effect on the
mutual information.
Table 3.2: Sensitivity of the Mutual Information
Sensitivity As usual, it is necessary to compute the sensitivity of the score function
(Zhang et al., 2014). This is done on per feature basis. Since the mutual information is
always non-negative and binary variables are assumed, the minimum possible mutual
information is 0, for example as for distribution 3.2a. The mutual information is minimal
since there are only examples in one of the classes - i.e. the entropy of the class label is
0.
In order to obtain the maximum change in the mutual information of the Xj and Y
as a result of one additional sample, it has to be added to the opposite class. Moreover,
the new example has to have Xj = 1 as opposed to 0, because when Xj completely
determines the value of Y , the mutual information is maximum.
Alternatively, the opposite example could be constructed, where starting with the
maximal mutual information and adding one example. The result will be the same.
Finally, the maximum change in the mutual information, and thus the sensitivity is










Is this sensitivity good? How does output perturbation compare with input perturba-
tion when the goal is to release the mutual informations?
A plot of the sensitivity as a function of the dataset size is shown in Figure 3.9.
In the limit of infinite data the sensitivity is 0, which is a desirable property. When
designing a private mechanism and using the Manhattan distance, we are concerned
with the scale of the noise and the ratio
e
DI
kI(Xj,Y )  Ĩ(Xj,Y )k1. (3.21)
The mutual information of binary variables is in the interval I(Xj,Y ) 2 [0,1]. Since e is
fixed to a small constant, we would like to compensate for it, by making kI(Xj,Y ) 
Ĩ(Xj,Y )k1/D big. The faster D/e approaches 0, the better. If there are around 100
samples and e = 0.1, the variance of the noise distribution will be roughly 0.5. This
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Figure 3.9: Sensitivity of mutual information as a function of the number of examples N.
might seem small given the range of the mutual information, but it is often the case in
practice that mutual information is fairly small. Thus, using the mutual information as a
score function is unlikely to produce good results. This remains to be shown empirically.
Privacy guarantee of Algorithm 3 Noise is added for each feature independently
with scale DI/(e/D). The informativeness of each feature is released in an e/D-
differentially private manner as a direct consequence of using the Laplace mecha-
nism. From the summation property of differential privacy it follows that releasing the
informativeness scores of all D features is e-differentially private.
Composing this algorithm with any e differentially private fitting procedure will
be 2e-differentially private if the same training data is used; or e differentially private
if the data was partitioned for feature selection and training.
Comparison of algorithms 2 and 3 Figure 3.10 compares the amount of noise in
the estimate of the mutual information for both algorithms, applied on the XWindows-
Doc dataset (D = 600,N = 900), taking half of the available privacy budget. Clearly,
both algorithms are ineffective – the scale of the noise is orders of magnitude greater
than the scale of the mutual information. Algorithm 3 is especially wasteful with privacy
noise variance in the hundredths. For a more formal treatment of this issue, Theorem
2.2.2 could be applied to derive the probability of certain errors. Both Algorithms 3 and
2 release a distribution over all D features. The privacy budget needs to be divided by
D, making both algorithms hopeless in large D settings.
Furthermore, the principle of minimum information suggests that unnecessary detail
is released: the mutual information is a real number, giving a very precise answer to
how informative a feature is. What is actually needed for feature selection is a binary
mask vector that specifies which feature is selected. Intuitively, it should be enough
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(a) Algorithm 2 The privacy noise is too
much to handle.































(b) Algorithm 3 The noise variance is enor-
mous.
Figure 3.10: Perturbed mutual information, Ĩ, XWindowsDoc dataset The true ver-
sus the perturbed mutual informations, in bits, for all 600 features, for e = 0.05. Both
algorithms are too wasteful.
to just release a binary decision, without explaining why this decision was reached.
Exploiting this intuition results in feature selection algorithms that are more privacy
efficient.
3.5.3 Iterative feature selection
This section investigates an iterative strategy for private feature selection which selects
T out of D original features. Although strictly speaking not e-differentially private, the
algorithm is considered with the purpose of showing that a naive iterative procedure
for selecting T features has unsatisfactory performance, even with relaxed privacy
restrictions. We take the mutual information heuristic, however the argument generalizes
to other metrics.
Outline The algorithm begins by dividing the total privacy budget by T , the number
of features to be selected. The true mutual informations for all features are computed;
then sorted and shifted. The main loop of the algorithm considers features in decreasing
order of their mutual information with the class. For each feature, the probability of
selecting it is computed by using the exponential mechanism with quality score the
mutual information. A binary decision is then made using the calculated probability of
success. The loop continues until T features are selected.
Privacy guarantee A feature is selected by using the exponential mechanism with
e0 = e/T ; therefore this procedure is e0-differentially private. If all of the first T features
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Algorithm 4 Iterative Sampling with MI
1: procedure SELECTFEATURES(X ,y,e,T )
2: e0 = e/T
3: Compute I(X ,y), a vector of length D
4: sortDescending(I)
5: I = I  IT+1
6: t = 0
7: selected = zeros(D,1)
8: while t < T do
9: It = top(I)
10: pt = 11+exp(  e02D It)
11: Xj ⇠ Ber(Xj|pt)
12: if Xj == 1 then
13: t = t +1
14: selected = selected[ one-hot encoding of Xj
15: return selected
are selected (and the loop makes exactly T iterations), the total privacy guarantee of the
algorithm would indeed by e.
However, not all features considered are guaranteed to be selected. Therefore, the
loop will execute more than T times, breaking e-differential privacy. In order to be
able to guarantee e-privacy we can take e0 = e/D, i.e. using the upper bound on the
iterations. However, as already seen, for large D this strategy is hopeless.
The true privacy guarantee of the algorithm can be computed by taking the actual
number of loop iterations and multiplying that by e/T . It is also possible to modify this
procedure, such that different values of e0 are used for different features.
Shift The mutual information for binary features is in the range [0,1]. However,
for real datasets, the values of the mutual information can be significantly closer to 0
than 1, for example, for the XWindowsDoc dataset, the top 5 most informative features
are in the range [0.07,0.2]. As seen previously, the exponential mechanism reduces
to the sigmoid( e
0
2D I) when the output is binary. Rescaling would allows us to avoid
probabilities that are too close to each other. Unfortunately, the sensitivity has to be
rescaled too, so multiplying by a constant will make no difference. Instead, the mutual
informations are only shifted to the left by IT+1. This allows the most T informative
features to be on the right side of 0, and more likely to be selected.
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Efficiency The running time of Algorithm 4 is O(D), since the loop can execute a
maximum of D times, ignoring the complexity of the sort subroutine.
Will Algorithm 4 be effective?
Flatness of distribution over features Consider Figure 3.11. In the non-private
context, the mutual information can provide a useful distribution over features. In
the private context, however, scaling the mutual information achieves nothing since
any constant is cancelled by the sensitivity. The distribution over features will be too
flat. What is necessary is a quality score function which is naturally large in value
compared to its sensitivity; first to be able to compensate for the small value of the
privacy parameter; second to allow informative and non-informative features to be
well-separated. Such feature will be introduced in Section 3.5.4.
Privacy budget efficiency Another issue with Algorithm 4 is its low privacy budget
efficiency. Although significantly better than previous naive versions, it is still possible
to improve upon the privacy budget used per feature. Due to the iterative nature of the
algorithm, we had to split the total budget for feature selection amongst the T selected
features. What if we could obtain the bit mask vector by sampling only once, using the
total privacy budget? We propose a new dynamic programming procedure for sampling
in this manner in Section 3.5.5.
3.5.4 Count-based distance metric
This section motivates and presents a new heuristic for private feature selection which
addresses the shortcomings of methods based on the mutual information.
The range of the mutual information compared with its sensitivity is not big enough
to compensate for the privacy restrictions. As a result, the distribution that the expo-
nential mechanism defines over the features is too flat. In contrast, counting queries
have been successfully used with private mechanisms. This is because the sensitivity of
counting queries is usually 1, but their range is much bigger, depending on the problem
setting. We exploit counting queries for private feature selection with good success. We
focus on binary data, but extensions are easily imaginable.
3.5.4.1 Definition
A feature is informative if it behaves differently for the different classes, for example
it appears with different probability in the different classes. For binary features in a
balanced two-class problem this could mean the feature is 1 more often in one of the
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(a) XWindowsDoc dataset, with privacy.




























(b) Newsgroups2 dataset, with privacy.


























(c) XWindowsDoc dataset, no privacy.


























(d) Newsgroups2 dataset, no privacy.
Figure 3.11: Mutual information score The probability of a feature being chosen as
a function of its mutual information. Under the differential privacy restriction (top row)
the probabilities of all features are close to 0.5, so the resulting Categorical distribution
over features will be too flat. In the non-private setting (bottom row) the distribution over
features is much more peaked and there is a clear separation between the good and
the bad features. The number of features to be selected is 10 and the privacy level is
e = 0.005 per feature. The mutual information is measured in bits.
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classes. When the classes are imbalanced it is not enough to compare the on-counts,
since they could be the same. However, the proportions of on-counts in the two classes
could be very different, simply because one class is bigger. The proposed heuristic
considers both the number of times a feature is on in a class and the number of times it
is off.















where the superscript means on or off and the subscripts give the feature number and
class. The heuristic computes the difference between the number of times the feature is
on in the first class and the number of times the feature is on in the second class. The
difference for the off-counts is also computed and then the maximum of those is taken.
In other words, the differences per count type are compared. When the classes are
balanced the two differences will be the same, since the off-counts are the total size of
the class minus the on-counts. When imbalanced, the heuristic would select the bigger
difference, giving more weight to a feature that is positively or negatively correlated
with the class. A procedure using the proposed distance measure will prefer features for
which at least one of the on-counts or off-counts are significantly bigger in one of the
classes.
Further intuition into why this is a good measure could be gained from considering
other distances. For example, instead of taking the differences per count type, we could
compare differences per class, i.e. for each class subtract the number of times the
feature is on and off in that class. Now, a most informative feature (one which has the
feature only turned on in the positive class) and a least informative feature (one which
is always on) will have the same scores. Taking the differences per count type avoids
this issue.
3.5.4.2 Sensitivity
In the most informative case, where the feature is always on in class 1 and always off in
class 0, the distance will be the size of the bigger class.
q(Xj) = max(kq(1)j1  0k1,k0 q
(0)
j0 k1) = q
(1)
j1 : (3.23)
If a negative sample is added to the negative (smaller) class, the maximum will not
change . If the two classes are the same size, the maximum will change by one. If a
positive example is added to the bigger class, the max will again change by one. If we
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Figure 3.12: Counts heuristic score Plots show the probability of a feature being
chosen as a function of its counts heuristic score. The probabilities are now further apart
compared with using the mutual information, so the resulting Categorical distribution will
be more peaked. The number of features to be selected is 10 and e = 0.005 for each
feature.
add negative example to the positive class, the max will likely not change, but if it does,
it will change by one. Similarly, in the least informative case, the distance will be the






Whatever example we add, this can change by at most one. Not surprisingly, the
sensitivity of the feature quality score function is
D = 1. (3.25)
3.5.4.3 Distribution
Figure 3.12 shows the probability of a feature being selected as a function of its
counts heuristic score. The probabilities are computed by Algorithm 4 but using the
counts heuristic instead of the mutual information. Now, the probabilities are not as
close to each other, which means the resulting distribution will be more peaked. The
improvement on the Newsgroup2 dataset is more significant.
3.5.4.4 Relation to other work
Stoddard et al. (2014) recently independently suggested using what they refer to as
Purity Index for feature selection. The purity index heuristic they offer is exactly the
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same as the count-based heuristic featured in this work. In addition, they also evaluate
the mutual information as a feature selection heuristic and state that it may result in too
noisy estimates, which coincides with our findings.
The authors further provide three algorithms for private feature selection. The first
algorithm is similar to the noisy variable ranking we have described: it perturbs the
feature scores using the Laplace mechanism and then picks the features which rise above
a certain threshold. To improve upon the results of this algorithm, they suggest a second
approach, where the features are clustered according to their scores using differentially
private k-means clustering. After private clusters are computed, a representative score
is computed for each cluster, and features are selected only from the best clusters.
Finally, they present a third algorithm, called private threshold testing, which perturbs
a threshold rather than the scores of all features. Although an interesting idea, it is
difficult to see how this would be applied in practice, since there is no explanation of
how the threshold could be chosen.
We now detail an algorithm for private feature selection, which enjoys better privacy
guarantees than the algorithms presented thus far.
3.5.5 Privacy efficient sampling
This section proposes a dynamic programming algorithm for feature selection, improv-
ing upon the privacy budget efficiency of the selection algorithms discussed previously.
Previous methods have had to divide the privacy budget available for feature se-
lection amongst the total number of features D. We have also made an attempt at an
iterative algorithm for feature selection, but shown that the task of selecting exactly T
features with privacy degrading according to T rather than D is non-trivial. We now
show a dynamic programming solution that selects all T features at once with good
privacy guarantees.



















where T is the number of features to be selected, D is the original dimensionality of the
data, qd = q(Xd) is the quality score for feature Xd , and () is the indicator function.
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where the sum is over all masks with T ones.
As typical in dynamic programming algorithms for sampling, Algorithm 5 makes a
forward and a backward pass. (For some function calls some arguments are omitted
for brevity, but it should be obvious what these are.) The forward pass computes the
normalization constant Z in 3.27 by breaking it down into smaller sums over sub-masks
with fewer than D terms. In particular, the function computeSum(t,d) computes the










mi = t. (3.28)
This sum is of course, built up of smaller sums, so the function is recursive. The
intermediate sums can be reused and are memoized in hmap, a hash table mapping (t,d)
combinations to s(t,d)s. The base cases are as follows. If the number of features still to
be selected is 0, then the sum is 0, since empty masks are not accepted. If the number of
features still to be selected is the same as the number of features to be considered, then
the sum contains one term only - the mask with all 1s. The sum s(t,d) is composed of the
sum where the dth bit is 1 and the sum where m(d) = 0. Thus, Z = computeSum(T,D).
Numerical issues due to the magnitude of the counts are avoided by tracking the log
sums.
A bit mask is obtained by backtrack sampling. The algorithm begins by sampling the
final D bit of the mask. The probability that the Dth bit is on is equal to the proportion
of the total sum Z which is made up by masks with m(D) = 1. m(d) is then sampled
from a Bernoulli with the computed probability.
Depending on the Dth bit, there are two options: there are still T bits left to turn on,
or T  1. The probability that the dth bit is on with t bits to still turn on is the proportion
of the sum s(t,d) where that bit is on. The algorithm is fully fledged out in 5.
Privacy guarantee Algorithm 5 defines a distribution over the possible mask vec-
tors using a mask quality score, which specifies the “goodness” of feature masks. The
privacy guarantee of the algorithm follows trivially from the use of the exponential
mechanism, but the sensitivity of the mask quality score needs to be derived.






where qd = q(Xd) is the quality score for feature Xd , md is the corresponding bit in the
feature mask and ÂDd=1 md = T , i.e. exactly T of the D bits in the mask are on.
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The sensitivity of the mask quality score is defined as the maximum change in the
sum above as a result of adding a new sample to the dataset. When a new point is added,
each of the qd’s can change by at most Dqd . The mask vector does not change, because
it is the output of the exponential mechanism. Finally, only T of the mask bits are on,
and therefore,













 T Dqd (3.30)
where qd = q(Xd), q0d = q(X
0
d), and Dqd is the sensitivity of qd , i.e. the maximum change
in each of the qds as a result of adding one example.
For the count heuristic the sensitivity of the quality score per feature is 1 and
therefore the total sensitivity of the feature map quality is T . For the mutual information














Sparse vector technique The composition theorem of differential privacy (see Theorem
2.3.2) state that a mechanism used for answering an adaptable list of queries should have
a privacy parameter that degrades proportionally to the number of answered queries.
The sparse vector technique (Dwork and Roth, 2014) was designed for online query-
answering where the list of queries is long and the sensitivity of each query is one.
It embodies the intuition that in some situations we are only interested in whether a
response to a query lies above or below some threshold, and when this is the case, the
privacy parameter should degrade with the number of positively answered queries. The
technique is called sparse because it is most useful when the number of positive answers
is much smaller than the total number of possible queries.
We can think of univariate feature selection for high-dimensional datasets as an-
swering a long list of adaptable queries, where there is one query per feature and the
response is whether or not the feature is selected.
The algorithm is build up of calls to a sub-routine called AboveThreshold. Above
threshold takes a threshold fixed in advance, an adaptable list of sensitivity-one-queries,
the data, and the privacy parameter e0, and outputs binary answers of whether the
threshold was exceeded. It adds noise to the true response and compares the result to
the threshold. For technical reasons, the algorithm works with a noise version of the
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Algorithm 5 Privacy efficient sampling
1: procedure SAMPLEMASK(e,D,q,T,D)
2: hmap = {}, an empty hashmap
3: m = zeros(D,1)
4: t = T
5: for d = D : 1 do
6: if t <= 0 then
7: p = 0
8: else if t > d then
9: p = 0
10: else




12: m(d) = Bernoulli(p)




17: key = makeKey(t,d)
18: if hmap.containsKey(key) then
19: s = hmap.get(key)
20: else if t == 0 then
21: s = 0
22: else if t == d then






25: st = computeSum(t,d 1)
26: st 1 = computeSum(t 1,d 1)+ e2D
27: s = log(1+ exp(min(st ,st 1) max(st ,st 1)))+max(st ,st 1)
28: hmap.put(key,s)
29: return s
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threshold. For each query, the response is 1 if the true response plus Laplace(4/e0)
is greater than Laplace(2/e0) plus the threshold. Each call to AboveThreshold is
guaranteed to halt only if it reaches a positive query. AboveThreshold is e0-differentially
private.
The Sparse algorithm makes T calls to AboveThreshold with a privacy parameter
e0 = eT , where T is the number of required positive queries (features to be selected).
Each time a positive query is reported, the algorithm restarts the remaining stream of
queries on a new instantiation of AboveThreshold. Sparse halts after it has found the
required number of positive queries T . The Sparse algorithm is e-differentially private,
following from the composition Theorem 2.3.2.
The Sparse algorithm has the same privacy guarantee as Algorithm 5 when the
feature quality metric is the count heuristic. While both techniques are similar in their
privacy efficiency, Algorithm 5 is easier to understand, does not require a complicated
proof, and is generalizable to new feature quality heuristics. For the Sparse algorithm,
the threshold needs to be fixed in advance, which causes inconvenience. Thus we
believe that Algorithm 5 is a useful contribution from a practical perspective.
Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism (Hardt and Rothblum, 2010) is
another technique for handling large collections of queries. It can be thought of as
a boosted version of the exponential mechanism which maintains an approximating
distribution over the domain of possible data samples. At each iteration of the algorithm,
it selects a query with high error via the exponential mechanism with a quality score the
difference between the true response of the query and the response on the approximating
dataset. The algorithm then computes a noisy version of the response on the true dataset
using the Laplace mechanism. Finally, the approximating distribution is adjusted using
the multiplicative weights rule so that it performs better on that query.
The privacy proof is as follows, assuming that all queries are 1-sensitive. If we
run T iterations of MWEM by the composition theorem, it is sufficient to compute
the privacy budget consumed by each iteration. At each iteration, the exponential
mechanism and the Laplace mechanism are both invoked with privacy parameter
e/2T . By sequential composition, Theorem 2.3.2, the whole algorithm is private with
parameter 2T ⇥ e/2T = e.
MWEM focuses on a few of the queries and tries to improve the response to them as
well as it can. Using this algorithm for feature selection, the question becomes whether
it is better to expend a fraction of the privacy budget on determining which features
to evaluate accurately, then providing noisy measurements for all features. It seems
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that MWEM might be useful for feature selection in datasets where some features are
significantly more informative than others or where features are highly correlated. If
features are highly correlated, then improving the measurement for some features will
result in improvement in the measurements for the rest of the features. In order to use
MWEM for feature selection, in the worst case we would need to perform D linear
queries, where D is the dimensionality of the original dataset, and thus we would lose
privacy budget compared with Algorithm 5.
Another issue with MWEM is that it is computationally inefficient: it manipulates a
probability distribution over a set exponentially large in the dimension of the data space.
This makes the algorithm difficult to scale to data of more than a few tens of features.
DualQuery (Gaboardi et al., 2014) also generates synthetic data. It differs from
MWEM in that it has improved computational scalability to higher-dimensional data.
We suggest that DualQuery is explored in future work on private feature selection, as
the benefits of generating synthetic data and selecting features based on it remained
unclear compared to selecting features directly.
Maximum Likelihood Postprocessing for Differential Privacy under Consis-
tency Constraints (Lee et al., 2015) also addresses the problem of differentially private
data release. Similar to other approaches, it shows that the accuracy of many data queries
can be improved by post-processing the perturbed data to ensure consistency constraints
that are known to hold for the original data. They formulate the post-processing
approach as a constrained maximum likelihood estimation problem equivalent to con-
strained l1 minimization. This and similar works are orthogonal to the approach taken in
this thesis, but we believe that investigation into synthetic data release prior to applying
machine learning methods could be a useful contribution. In particular, it would be
useful to investigate the implications of the principle of least information (Dwork and
Roth, 2014) in more detail.
3.6 Experiments
A major goal of this work has been to provide a differentially private classifier whose
performance scales well with the number of features in a dataset. The principle of mini-
mum information (Dwork and Roth, 2014) lead to the design of a private Naive Bayes
classifier, due to its efficiency in number of parameters and training. Unfortunately, even
with this most straightforward of fitting procedures, the private Naive Bayes classifier
has not performed well on real datasets of high dimensionality.
























Figure 3.13: The mutual information, measured in bits, of the top hundred most informa-
tive features for the first five UCI datasets (XWindowsDoc through Newsgroup2).
A natural step towards improving this mechanism’s scalability is dimensionality
reduction. We have proposed two heuristics for the quality of features, based on the
mutual information and feature counts; as well as a procedure for feature selection
based on these heuristics.
With the ability to privately obtain a subset of features, it is now time to compare
the proposed heuristics. In more detail, experiments will be conducted using the private
feature sampling algorithm, Algorithm 5, with each of the two heuristics. Each of
the selected feature subsets is used to train a e/2-differentially private Naive Bayes
classifier. These two classifiers are compared against another private Naive Bayes
classifier trained on a non-privately selected feature subset.
Data We use six real world datasets, the details of which can be found in Appendix
A. The datasets have been chosen to mimic different settings which are often encoun-
tered in practice: XWindowsDoc dataset mimics a large D small N problem; the Adult,
Newsgroup2 and Newsgroup3 represent imbalanced problems; the Mushrooms and
Newsgroup datasets exemplify moderate sized datasets with easy to handle dimensional-
ity. All datasets are or have been converted into binary data (more details are available in
Appendix A). Most importantly, numeric features have been discretized and categorical
features have been one-hot encoded. Features with missing data have been removed.
Procedures compared The experiments compare several different potential ways
to train a private NB classifier. First, a private NB classifier is trained using all features,
i.e. the original data. Second, feature selection is employed prior to training with the
goal of dimensionality reduction. The effects on private Naive Bayes’s accuracy due to
three different feature selection approaches are examined: non-private feature selection,
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private feature selection with a quality score function based on the mutual information
of a feature and the class, and private feature selection with the count-based quality
score function. Finally, these results are compared against the majority baseline, as
well as a non-private Naive Bayes classifier. All classifiers are 1-Laplace smoothed and
trained by maximum likelihood.
Data partitioning All of the available training data is used at each step – feature
selection and training. The privacy level of the resulting procedures is controlled by
the privacy parameter and the sequential composition theorem 2.3.2. An alternative
approach could have split the data into disjoint subsets and used one subset per step.
Differential privacy would then have had to be proven by the parallel composition
theorem 2.3.3.
For a Naive Bayes classifier, the relationship between the accuracy and e is not
significantly different from the relationship between the accuracy and the dataset size.
This means that for a certain dataset, similar performance is expected from the algorithm
if e is reduced twice and if the dataset size is reduced twice. Indeed, in the Newsgroup
dataset, a 0.5-differentially private NB classifier trained on all data achieves 78.6%
train accuracy; a 1-differentially private NB classifier trained on half of the available
data achieves 78.4%. Thus, partitioning the dataset versus dividing the budget has little
effect on accuracy.
Privacy settings The privacy level for these experiments is set to 0.1. This is a
common setting of the privacy parameter, as it is small enough to simulate settings
where privacy restrictions are significant, but big enough to allow limited amount of
data to still be useful. Consider Figure 3.14, where two extreme settings of the privacy
parameter have been tested on the Newsgroup dataset - 0.01 and 1. The plot shows
the accuracies of the private Naive Bayes classifiers for the three feature selection
techniques (one non-private and two private). The majority baseline for this dataset is
57%.
In the first plot, the privacy parameter is too small and the two fully 0.01-differentially
private classifiers have baseline performance. Feature selection has not been able to
improve upon the performance of the 0.01-differentially private classifier trained with
all features.
In the second plot, the privacy is quite relaxed and the private classifier is only
10% away from the non-private in terms of accuracy. In such situations the advantages
of feature selection are minimal, because the performance of the private classifiers is
already quite good. In such situations it might be better to avoid feature selection and
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 Private NB, test
MI + mask, test
Counts heu + mask, test
Private NB, all features
Non−private NB
(b) e = 1
Figure 3.14: Effect on accuracy of private Naive Bayes classifiers due to changing
the privacy parameter on the Newsgroup dataset (majority baseline - 57%). On the
horizontal axis is the number of features used to train each classifier. Each plus mark
corresponds to a classifier trained on x features. The red pluses show a 0.1-differentially
private classifier with non-private feature selection according to mutual information. The
blue pluses show a 0.05-differentially private classifier with 0.05-differentially private
classifier with 0.05-differentially private mutual-information-based feature selection. The
green pluses show a 0.05-differentially private classifier with 0.05-differentially private
count-based feature selection. The green and blue training procedures are jointly 0.1-
differentially private. The pink dotted line represents a non-private Naive Bayes classifier
trained on all features. The purple dotted line represents a 0.1-differentially private
classifier trained on all features. All plus marks correspond to results after feature
selection, but only the blue and green marks represent fully-private algorithms.
save the privacy budget for training.
Thus, private feature selection is most likely to be useful in situations where data
is limited to moderate, and where the privacy restriction is significant. These are the
settings in which we compare feature selection methods.
Namely, the private classifier with no feature selection is 0.1-differentially private;
the classifier with feature selection is also 0.1-differentially private, where half of the
privacy budget is used for feature selection, and the other half, for training.
Additional settings The number of times each of the randomized procedures is
repeated is 10 and the maximum number of features selected is around 60.
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(a) XWindowsDoc dataset,
majority baseline is 50%.
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(c) Adult dataset, majority
baseline is 76%.
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Private NB, all features
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(d) Newsgroups dataset, ma-
jority baseline is 57%.
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MI + mask, test
Counts heu + mask, test
Private NB, all features
Non−private NB
(e) Newsgroups2 dataset,
majority baseline is 81%.
















 Private NB, test
MI + mask, test
Counts heu + mask, test
Private NB, all features
Non−private NB
(f) Newsgroups3 dataset,
majority baseline is 82%.
Figure 3.15: Effect on performance gains from private feature selection. The red
pluses represent a 0.1-differentially private Naive Bayes classifier, which is trained on
a subset of the features chosen by non-private feature selection according to mutual
information. The blue pluses represent a 0.05-differentially private classifier, trained on
features selected by 0.05-differentially private mutual-information-based feature selection.
The green pluses show a 0.05-differentially private classifier, trained on features selected
by 0.05-differentially private count-based feature selection. The green and blue training
procedures are jointly 0.1-differentially private. The pink dotted line represents a non-
private Naive Bayes classifier trained on all features. The purple dotted line represents a
0.1-differentially private classifier trained on all features.
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3.6.1 Results
The results are shown in Figure 3.15. The legend for this figure is the same as for Figure
3.14, but is detailed again here for self-containment.
Each marker in the plots represents the accuracy of one private Naive Bayes classifier
trained with a specific number of features. The number of features is on the horizontal
axis. The color of the plus marks represents the algorithm used for feature selection. Red
stands for non-private feature selection based on the mutual information. Blue stands
for 0.05-differentially private feature selection based on the mutual information. Green
stands for 0.05-differentially private feature selection based on the counts heuristic.
The red classifier is a 0.1-differentially private Naive Bayes; however this guarantee
is broken by the non-private feature selection performed prior to training. The other
two training procedures are 0.05-differentially private, making the classifiers fully
0.1-differentially private. The pink dotted line represents a non-private Naive Bayes
classifier trained on all features. The purple dotted line represents a 0.1-differentially
private classifier trained on all features. To sum up, all plus marks correspond to
results after feature selection, but only the blue and green marks represent fully-private
algorithms.
To begin with, we look at the XWindowsDoc and Newsgroup datasets. These
datasets are balanced, the majority class label being 50% and 57% of cases, respectively.
As obvious from the red marks in figures 3.15a and 3.15d non-private feature selection
was able to improve the performance of the private classifiers. Private Naive Bayes with
private mutual-information-based feature selection, in blue, produced similar results
to the classifier trained on all features. Private count-based feature selection, however,
did have a positive effect – accuracy of private Naive Bayes improved by around 20%,
close to that achieved by non-private feature selection.
Secondly, consider the results for the Mushrooms dataset, shown in 3.15b. The
dataset is balanced with a majority class share of 52%. On this dataset the private clas-
sifier trained on all features has non-trivial performance. Both the mutual information
and the count-based feature selection improve that performance further, by about 10%.
The effect of the two feature selection heuristics is very similar.
Let us consider the effect of using the mutual information versus the count-based
feature selection on the XWindowsDoc and Mushrooms datasets, and find out why the
count-based heuristic resulted in a more significant gain compared with the mutual
information one on the former dataset. Figure 3.18 shows the probability of a feature
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being chosen as a function of its quality score. For the XWindowsDoc dataset using
the MI results in a very flat distribution over the features, whereas the count-based
heuristic does not. On the Mushrooms dataset, the difference between the distributions
resulting from the two heuristics is almost non-present. To understand why this is,
consider Figure 3.13, which shows the mutual information for the 100 most informative
features in all datasets. The values of the mutual information for the Mushrooms dataset
are significantly bigger than those for the XWindowsDoc dataset. For the latter, the
sensitivity of the mutual information is too big compared with the range of values,
causing the signal to be trumped by the noise.
Thirdly, on Newsgroup2, Figure 3.15e, no improvement was achieved by employing
feature selection, be it private or non-private. For this dataset, throwing away some fea-
tures does not improve the accuracy, because there are no features which are especially
useful compared with the rest. This is shown in Figure 3.13, where the most informative
feature has mutual information of around only 0.05 bits.
For the Adult dataset, Figure 3.15c, non-private feature selection provides a very
slight gain in accuracy over the private Naive Bayes classifier trained on all features.
However, neither of the private feature selection techniques were able to achieve a
similar result.
Consider the private mutual-information-based feature selection. Figure 3.13 shows
that some features in the Adult dataset are more informative than others. Furthermore,
Figure 3.18e, which shows the probability of a feature being selected as a function
of its mutual information, suggests that the private selection procedure was fairly
confident. The private feature selection chose the features that were believed to be
useful. Unfortunately, it left too little privacy budget for training, meaning that the gain
from the dimensionality reduction was destroyed. In Figure 3.17 we increase the privacy
level to 0.4. For the Adult dataset employing feature selection is counterproductive: it is
better to use the whole privacy budget and all features. The amount of data is enough to
allow the private classifier to overcome slightly more relaxed privacy restrictions easily,
without the need for dimensionality reduction.
With respect to the count-based heuristic, in Figure 3.18f we confirm an important
observation: the heuristic is useful when there is not enough data available or the privacy
constraints are extremely stringent. In other cases, it is sufficient to use the mutual
information for feature selection. In more detail, because the Adult dataset is relatively
big, the counts too are big. This means that the small privacy parameter does not
affect the feature selection measurably. What we are seeing is akin to overfitting – the
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selection procedure has become too confident that certain features are good. However,
as we can see from both Figures 3.15c and 3.17, the heuristic can fail to pick the best
features.
Finally, the experiment on Newsgroup3 dataset demonstrates the usefulness of
the counts heuristic on an imbalanced dataset. Contrary to Adult and Newsgroup2,
non-private feature selection does help here.
Consider the mutual information for imbalanced datasets. The maximum of the
mutual information is H2(p(y = 1)) and this is very small when one of the classes
is very small, i.e. p(y = 1) is close to 0 or 1. As seen previously, when the range of
the mutual information is small, and it can result in flatter distribution over variables.
The count-based feature selection doesn’t suffer from this problem and achieves an
improvement on this dataset.
In summary, private feature selection is a beneficial preprocessing step in training a
private Naive Bayes classifier, when some features in the dataset are believed to be more
informative than others. The count-based heuristic is especially useful in datasets where
the range of the mutual information is too small, the privacy restrictions are severe, or
the dataset size is small. On the other hand, if the mutual information is relatively big,
the privacy constraints are lenient, or data is abundant, the mutual information can be
an effective tool in feature selection.
In conclusion, we have shown that private dimensionality reduction through feature
selection can make private classification practical, where it was not before. This is
especially true for datasets which are high-dimensional but contain redundant features.
Two heuristics for feature selection were examined. The first is based on counts of times
a feature appears in the two classes, and the second is based on the mutual information
of a feature and the class label. Both viable options for feature selection, the first
heuristic is preferred whenever privacy is high and dataset size is small.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have developed a differentially private algorithm for training a Naive
Bayes classifier. Using several real world datasets, we have demonstrated that the
classifier can achieve non-trivial performance on datasets with moderate dimensionality.
For problems where data is not enough, we have proposed two dimensionality reduction
techniques based on feature selection. We have proved differential privacy for each of
the feature selection methods. We have proven empirically that one of the techniques,
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Figure 3.16: Distribution over features resulting from the mutual information and the
counts heuristic. In blue is the normalized mutual information score and in red is the
normalized count score. On the horizontal axis is the feature number. A bigger score
for a particular feature number means the corresponding feature is more useful. Aim of
figure is to show how the Adult dataset differs from the other datasets in a way which
explains the failure of the count-based heuristic on this dataset.
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MI + mask, test
Counts heu + mask, test
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Non−private NB
Figure 3.17: Comparing feature selection heuristics on the Adult dataset with e = 0.4.
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(a) XWindowsDoc dataset, mutual informa-
tion.
























(b) XWindowsDoc dataset, counts.

























(c) Mushrooms dataset, mutual information.





















(d) Mushrooms dataset, counts.

























(e) Adult dataset, mutual information.





















(f) Adult dataset, counts.
Figure 3.18: Mutual information versus counts heuristic score Plots show the prob-
ability of a feature being chosen as a function of its heuristic score. The bigger the slope,
the more confident the feature selection is. The probabilities for counts scores are further
apart compared with the those for the mutual information, so the resulting distribution
over features will be more peaked. We take the number of features to be selected is 10
and e = 0.05 for each feature.
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based on a newly proposed feature quality heuristic, is able to improve the performance




Naive Bayes is a generative classifier: it models the joint probability of the input
x and the class label y, p(x,y), uses the Bayes rule to calculate p(y|x), and picks
the most likely label. A natural question is whether it is a good idea to model the
joint probability, when only the posterior probability over the class is necessary for
classification. The class conditional densities may contain a lot of structure that has
little effect on the posterior probabilities of the class labels. Approaches that model the
posterior probabilities of class labels directly are called discriminative models. On the
one hand, a classifier should not solve a more general problem as an intermediate step
to the classification problem, but on the other, there is no general criterion for choosing
between discriminative and generative classifiers (Ng and Jordan, 2002).
Clearly, it is important to examine both generative and discriminative classifiers un-
der differential privacy. We investigate logistic regression, since it is the discriminative
equivalent of Naive Bayes for discrete data.
We begin by an extensive review of the main private l2-regularized logistic regres-
sion mechanisms, followed by an investigation of their accuracy on the real datasets
previously used. The chapter concludes with empirical evidence suggesting that feature
selection is unlikely to improve the performance of private logistic regression.
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4.2 Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a discriminative classifier which is linear in the parameters. The
logistic regression model is as follows:
p(y|x,q) = Ber(y|sigm(qT x)). (4.1)
To fit the logistic regression model parameters, we could minimize the normalized






[yn logµn +(1  yn) log(1 µn)] , (4.2)
where µ(x) = sigm(qT x) = p(y = 1|x). To avoid overfitting, the following regularized
objective function is used: NLL(q)+ l2Nkqk
2
2. This objective function is minimized
by an iterative gradient-based optimization algorithm, because the solution cannot be
found analytically.
The most famous differentially private algorithm for logistic regression was designed
in the context of empirical risk minimization (Chaudhuri et al., 2011). In that context,
the objective function of logistic regression can be rewritten as:









In the following we will refer to l as the loss function and to the term l2Nkqk
2, as the
regularizer.
We state one interpretation of the regularization parameter l, as it is useful later on.
The posterior probability of the model parameters given the data is proportional to the
likelihood of the parameters times the prior:
p(q|X ) µ p(X |q)p(q). (4.4)
Taking the log the above becomes
log p(q|X ) = log p(X |q)+ log p(q)+ const. (4.5)






Finally we can set the regularization parameter l = 1s2 . Rewriting this in terms of the




We now review the most established private logistic regression models in the litera-
ture.
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4.3 Output perturbation
The most straightforward method of designing a private logistic regression mechanism
is output perturbation. Generally speaking, output perturbation involves computing the
vector of interest using a non-private mechanism and only then adding privacy-related
noise before finally outputting the vector. In the case of logistic regression, this involves
optimizing the logistic regression objective function to compute a parameter vector;
then drawing a noise vector from a certain parametric family of distributions with zero
mean and some variance; and finally releasing the sum of the parameter vector and the
noise vector (Chaudhuri et al., 2011).
With respect to the sensitivity of the objective function, under certain assumptions
on the data, regularizer and loss function, the following theorem holds (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011):
Theorem 4.3.1. For a differentiable and 1-strongly convex regularizer, and a convex
and differentiable loss function with kl0(z)k  1 for all z, the sensitivity of the cost
function is at most 2l , where l is the regularization constant.
Applying the theorem to logistic regression relies on the data being preprocessed
such that the norm of each sample is bounded by 1, i.e. kxnk2  1. As a consequence,
the noise vector b is sampled from a distribution with scale De =
2
le . The algorithm is
detailed in 6.
Algorithm 6 Output perturbation version of private logistic regression
1: procedure PRIVATEERMOUTPUTPERT(X ,y,e,l) . Data X , privacy parameter e,
regularization constant l





3: return qpriv = argmin
q
J(q,X )+b
When fitting logistic regression, cross-validation is usually performed to find the
best regularization parameter. Private logistic regression is no exception. Consider
the result of cross-validation with the output mechanism for logistic regression. The




le . If l is very big, then the scale of the privacy noise will be close to zero and the
performance of the classifier will be close to that of the non-private one. Recall further
the relationship between the regularization parameter and the variance of the prior on







Both the privacy noise distribution and the distribution on the possible model parameters
depend on the value of the regularization parameter. For a big regularization parameter,
the privacy noise will be negligible, but the model parameters might be forced too close
to 0 and the classifier might underfit the data. For small values of l, the privacy noise
will be bigger, but the model will be more complex, since the learned weights will be
bigger. There is an important difference between how l affects the two distributions:
the standard deviation of distribution of the weights will reduce with
p
l, whereas the
deviation of the privacy noise will reduce with l. Therefore, cross-validation will prefer
bigger values of l.
Next we describe one of the most interesting differentially private methods of the
past few years.
4.4 Objective perturbation
Objective perturbation was first proposed by (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2008) and
(Chaudhuri et al., 2011) as a technique for creating differentially private classifiers
learned via empirical risk minimization. In this text the term Private ERM is used for
brevity to refer to private logistic regression by objective perturbation.
The objective perturbation method flowed out of an understanding of the mutually
beneficial relationship between regularization and differential privacy. The authors
argue that since regularization is used to prevent the extreme reliance of the learned
parameters on the data, it should also partially help satisfy differential privacy.
The main idea behind objective perturbation is to add noise to the objective function
itself and only then to optimize it.
4.4.1 Algorithm
For a dataset X containing N samples and a cost function J(q,X ), the private version of
J is shown below. It takes as inputs the training data X , the privacy parameter e, the
regularization constant l, and a constant c.
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where J(q,X ) is the standard regularized logistic regression objective. In (4.8) b is a





where a is a normalizing constant and b is a function of the privacy parameter e and the
sensitivity of the cost function J.
We now present the algorithm and delve into its specifics. From (Chaudhuri et al.,
2011):
Algorithm 7 Objective perturbation
1: procedure PRIVATEERM(X ,y,e,l,c) . Data X , privacy parameter e,
regularization constant l
2: e0 = e  log(1+ 2cl +
c2
l2 )
3: if e0 > 0 then
4: D = 0
5: else




7: e0 = e2
8: b = e02
9: Draw a vector b according to 4.9
10: return qpriv = argmin
q
J(q,X )priv + 12Dkqk2
The original presentation of the algorithm uses L = lN . We chose to use small l in
the presentation of the algorithm and experiments, because it is more natural when the
average loss is being optimized.
The constant c is chosen analytically so that the following theorem is satisfied:
Theorem 4.4.1. If the regularizer is 1-strongly convex and doubly differentiable, and
the loss l(z) is convex and doubly differentiable, with kl0(z)k  1 and kl00(z)k  c, 8z,
then the objective perturbation algorithm preserves e-differential privacy.
For logistic regression c = 14 , since l
00(z) = 1(1+e z)(1+ez) . For other algorithms, it
would be necessary to find the upper bound of the second derivative of the loss function
in order to determine c.
The proof of Theorem 4.4.1 relies on the sensitivity of the cost function, see Theorem
4.3.1. Importantly, both of these theorems assume that the norm of each sample is
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bounded by 1. One way of achieving this is to use the maximum of feature values.
Computing this statistic without spending privacy budget may break the guarantee
of the complete learning procedure. Since this issue is not addressed in (Chaudhuri
et al., 2011), we leave it as future work and recommend that care is taken in real-world
applications.
4.4.2 Noise behaviour for large N
For all settings of the privacy parameter e, the variance of the noise vector b in the
algorithm is constant with respect to the number of samples N. Thus the variance of
the noise term b
T q
N goes to zero with large N, and the cost function tends to that of the
non-private algorithm.
4.4.3 Noise behavior with D
The algorithm adds a scaled dot product of a D-dimensional noise vector and the weight
vector to the non-private objective function. The result is a linear shift to the objective.
The new position of the optimum after this perturbation depends on the shape of the
objective function. If the objective is very flat, a small perturbation to it can result in a
large shift of the optimal parameters. However, if the objective is strongly peaked, the
shift to the optimum will be very small.
The scale of the noise is independent of the data dimensionality D. However,
for problems where the dimensionality is high and data is not enough, the objective
function may be fairly flat, which will result in big changes to the optimal parameters
after objective perturbation.
4.4.4 Interpretation and comparison with output perturbation













for large l (4.10)
=) e0 ⇡ e  2c
l
> 0 (4.11)
() l > 1
2e
(4.12)
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e e0,branch1 e0,branch2
e = 0.1 l  5 l 2 ( 0.5,5)
e = 0.5 l  1 l 2 ( 0.2,1)
e = 1 l  0.5 l 2 ( 0.25,0.5)
e = 10 l  0.005 l 2 ( 0.0025,0.005)
Table 4.1: Example values for l and e0, showing when a branch is preferred.
Therefore, the algorithm opts for the first branch if l > 1/2e. Table 4.1 shows some
example values for l and e. The negative intervals are ignored, as it is common to have a
positive l. We see that in the first branch of the conditional we use more regularization,
so we can afford to use a less restrictive privacy budget. Conversely, in the second
branch the smaller amount of regularization is not enough to achieve privacy and this is
reflected in the tighter privacy budget.
The algorithm looks at l and makes a choice depending on whether it is big or small.
When l is sufficiently big, the scale of the noise vector distribution is roughly 4l2le 1 .
For a small l (very close to zero), the algorithm discards the original regularization
constant and picks one that is 10 when e is 0.1, 100 when e is 0.01, 1000 when e is
0.001, and so on. The scale of the noise distribution is 4e .
In cross-validation, will the objective perturbation algorithm prefer a big or small
regularization parameter? We can find the answer to this question by considering the
distribution over model parameters and the noise distribution. Consider the following
example, where l1 = 0.1 and e = 0.1. The algorithm will pick the second branch and










2. Now take l2 = 10.
The first branch will be chosen; the standard deviation of the weights will be again 1p
10
;
the deviation of the noise, 4l2le 1 = 40
p
2. The two branches will have the same effect
and the performance of the algorithm will be identical. Whatever the algorithm chooses,
the effective regularization will be significant.
We now compare, in the context of e = 0.1, the objective perturbation with the
output perturbation algorithm above. Since both mechanisms have large effective
regularization, it suffices to compare them for large values of l.
The objective perturbation method will add noise with scale 4l2le 1 or
4
e . The output
perturbation method adds noise with scale 2le . For e = 0.1 and l > 1 the scale of the
output perturbation is always smaller than the scale of the objective perturbation noise.
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If the objective function is very flat, it is possible that the optimum is perturbed a
lot as a result of the perturbation of the objective function. In such situations, because
the scale of the output perturbation noise is smaller, the objective perturbation method
may perform worse than the output perturbation method. However, if the objective
function is very peaked, it is possible that the objective perturbation method achieves
better results.
Table 4.2 shows the average test accuracies achieved by output perturbation and
objective perturbation on several datasets, detailed in Table 3.1. The privacy level is set
to e = 0.1 and each procedure is run 10 times. Regularization parameters are found by
5-fold cross-validation, where l 2 {10 3,10 2,10 1,1,10,102,103,104,105}. Both
private mechanisms for logistic regression perform poorly compared with standard
logistic regression, most often than not achieving baseline results. The output perturba-
tion mechanism performs better than objective perturbation on two datasets, suggesting
that the objective perturbation is unlikely to be a significant improvement upon output
perturbation in real-world applications. Table 4.2 suggests that both algorithms for
private logistic regression will have trouble producing useful results on real-world data.
Following the positive effect of dimensionality reduction on the accuracy of private
Naive Bayes classifiers, we now go on to investigate feature selection with private
logistic regression. Even though our results suggest that objective perturbation may not
necessarily be the clear winner in practical applications, we perform further experiments
with this algorithm, since it is claimed to have slightly better theoretical guarantees,
in particular, better sample complexity (Chaudhuri et al., 2011). Additionally, Private
ERM (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) has attracted some attention in the research community
and remains an often cited paper.
4.5 Empirical analysis
In the following section we evaluate logistic regression under differential privacy as
represented by the Private ERM algorithm (Chaudhuri et al., 2011). The first goal is
to test the usefulness of private logistic regression compared with the private Naive
Bayes classifier on real datasets. In the non-private setting, logistic regression usually
outperforms Naive Bayes classifiers, because logistic regression optimizes an objective
function that directly relates to classification performance. In the private setting, the
performance of the two algorithms depends on the sensitivity and the scale of the noise
they incur. A parallel between private logistic regression and private Naive Bayes cannot










XWindowsDoc 80 (3) 50 (-3) 73 (-3) 50
Mushrooms 100 (2) 50 (2) 71 (3) 52
Adult 85 (2) 76 (3) 76 (4) 76
Newsgroup 91 (0) 56 (-2) 61 (4) 57
Newsgroup2 90 (1) 81 (2) 81 (3) 81
Newsgroup3 93 (-1) 82 (5) 82 (4) 82
Table 4.2: Comparison between the output perturbation method and the objective
perturbation method for private logistic regression. Shown are the test accuracies (in
percent, rounded to the nearest digit) over 10 runs of the algorithms for e = 0.1, where
l was chosen by 5-fold cross-validation. In the brackets, we show the exponent of
the most often picked regularization parameter, i.e. the mode of log10 l over all runs.
The set of possible regularizers is {10 3,10 2,10 1,1,10,102,103,104,105}. The two
methods produce very similar results and there is no evidence to suggest that the
objective perturbation method is generally superior in practice. The final column shows
the majority baseline for each dataset, i.e. the prediction accuracy of a classifier which
always predicts the bigger class. The results suggest that both algorithms for private
logistic regression will have trouble producing useful results on real-world data.
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be drawn solely from the discriminative nature of the former and empirical investigation
is needed.
4.5.1 Experimental setup
Data Experiments are performed with the Private ERM algorithm on the six datasets
used previously in Private Bernoulli Naive Bayes MLE based on the Laplace mechanism:
XWindowsDoc, Mushrooms, Adult, and Newsgroup 1, 2, and 3, detailed in Appendix
A.
The datasets have been chosen to mimic different settings which are often encoun-
tered in practice: XWindowsDoc dataset mimics a large D small N problem; the Adult,
Newsgroup2 and Newsgroup3 represent imbalanced problems; the Mushrooms and
Newsgroup datasets exemplify moderate sized datasets with easy to handle dimension-
ality. All datasets are or have been converted into binary data. The exact preprocessing
done for each dataset is detailed in Appendix A. Most importantly, numeric features
have been discretized and categorical features have been one-hot encoded. Features
with missing data have been removed.
Procedures compared The following procedures were compared. First, a private
logistic regression classifier is trained using all features, i.e. the original data. Second,
feature selection is employed prior to training with the goal of dimensionality reduction.
The effects of three different approaches to feature selection are examined: non-private
feature selection, private feature selection with a quality score function based on the
mutual information of a feature and the class, and private feature selection with the
count-based quality score function. Finally, these results are compared against the
majority baseline, defined as the proportion of samples in the bigger class, a non-private
logistic regression, and a Naive Bayes classifier.
Cross-validation The non-private NB classifier is 1-Laplace smoothed and the
logistic regression is trained by MAP.
Importantly, for all logistic regression classifiers, the regularization parameter was
chosen by non-private 5-fold cross-validation. The complete set of regularization
parameters considered is {10 3,10 2,10 1,1,10,102,103,104,105}. Note that non-
private cross-validation breaks the formal privacy guarantee, since the composition
theorem is violated. Future work should attempt to correct this shortcoming.
Budget partitioning As always, when employing an additional pre-training step,
we have to ensure that this step solidifies rather than breaks the end-to-end privacy of
Chapter 4. Private Logistic Regression 86
the training procedure. As previously explained, one way to achieve this is to dedicate a
portion of the available privacy budget. An alternative is to partition the original dataset
into two disjoint datasets and use each one for the separate steps.
We have seen that for private Naive Bayes there is no clear advantage of either
approach when the data is moderate and when the privacy budget is relatively low.
Private logistic regression behaves similarly, as we will now show.
There are two cases to consider as part of the algorithm; however, as discussed
previously, cross-validation will prefer the first case. In this case D = 0 the last term














If the number of samples was to decrease twice, to preserve the same minimum, l will
have to increase twice and b will have to increase twice. The scale of the noise added
is b = 2/e0 ⇡ 2/e. If e was decreased twice, the scale of the noise would also increase
twice. The variance of the noise would increase 4 times and the standard deviation
would increase twice. This would make the resulting noise vector b twice as large.
Thus, halving the amount of data and halving the privacy parameter will decrease the
accuracy of the algorithm similarly.
Privacy settings To allow comparison of the performance of private logistic regres-
sion with private Naive Bayes, the privacy parameter for this set of experiments is also
set to e = 0.1. Previous experiments with private logistic regression have shown that
at this privacy level it is difficult to obtain satisfactory results unless abundant data is
available (cf. Appendix B). When feature selection is employed, the privacy budget is
equally split between feature selection and training.
Additional settings Each randomized procedure is repeated 10 times. The vertical
lines show the standard error, computed by dividing the standard deviation of the
accuracies for each feature subset by the square root of 10. Due to the low performance
of private logistic regression the standard deviations are small and so the vertical
lines are sometimes not clearly visible in the plots. The optimization routine used is
minimize.m (Rasmussen, 2014).
4.6 Results and Discussion
Results are shown in Figure 4.2, and the legend is shown in Figure 4.1. For all datasets
non-private logistic regression matches or outdoes the performance of the Naive Bayes
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Figure 4.1: Legend for Figure 4.2. Each empty circle represents the mean test accuracy
for a particular subset of the features in a dataset and the vertical lines show the standard
error. The orange dashed line refers to private logistic regression with no feature
selection. Red stands for the private logistic regression with non-private feature selection
by the mutual information with the class; blue stands for private logistic regression
with private feature selection using the mutual information; green stands for private
logistic regression with private feature selection using the count heuristic. Finally, the
red and purple dashed lines refer to the standard Naive Bayes and logistic regression,
respectively.
classifier. With privacy, the situation is much bleaker: for all datasets, private logistic
performance using all features achieves close to baseline performance. Feature selection
is unable to improve the accuracy to a satisfactory level.
Insight into why this algorithm performs badly can be obtained by considering the
difference between the regularization term and the privacy noise term. The Gaussian
prior on weights helps by reducing weights of the features whose estimate is uncertain.
The uncertainty is due to not having enough data or not having conclusive data. In
contrast, the privacy noise term penalizes all weights, independent of how good their
estimate is. In essence, the private algorithm puts a restriction on how informative a
feature can be independent of how well supported it is by the data. It is difficult to see
how this algorithm could be useful in practice unless there is enough data to compensate
for the noise.
4.6.1 Conclusion
In this chapter we have compared the output and objective perturbation algorithms for
private logistic regression, showing that their performance is mostly unsatisfactory and
may be problem specific. We have concluded that in practice, cross-validation will
result in both algorithms regularizing the objective function significantly. Finally, we
have demonstrated that for the objective perturbation algorithm private feature selection
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(f) Newsgroups3 dataset. Counts heuristic
helps with this imbalanced dataset.
Figure 4.2: Comparison of the count-based score function and the mutual score func-
tion, using Algorithm 7. Feature selection and training are jointly 0.1-differentially pri-
vate. For each subset of features and each run of the training procedure, 5-fold cross-
validation is used to select one out of the following set of regularization parameters:
{10 3,10 2,10 1,1,10,102,103,104,105}.
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is unlikely to improve performance. Performance is worse than the that of differentially
private Naive Bayes and it is often close to a simple guessing baseline.
Chapter 5
Future Work
In Chapter 1 we developed a differentially private Naive Bayes classifier for binary
features. A natural extension is to develop Naive Bayes classifiers for numeric and
categorical data. As part of such future work, the sensitivity of the private mechanism’s
quality function would have to be derived. For real-valued features there is a danger that
the sensitivity of the quality function could become unbounded. To avoid this problem,
the features would have to be bounded by rescaling. Having derived the new sensitivity
of the quality function, the private Naive Bayes fitting procedure developed in this work
can be used with very little modification.
In this thesis and in previous work, feature rescaling has been assumed to be a safe
data preprocessing step. In practice it is common to use certain statistics about features
in a dataset, such as the minimum and maximum of features (the columns of the design
matrix). However, using such statistics may not guarantee differential privacy and could
potentially break the privacy guarantee of the whole learning process. Such operations
may need to be made differentially private by spending certain amount of the total
privacy budget and applying the differential privacy composition theorems. Further
investigation into feature normalization and scaling is important future work.
A more significant improvement upon the current work comes from a change in
mindset. In this thesis, and all prior work on differentially private machine learning
methods, the tendency has been for a private mechanism to output private model
parameters. For example, in our private Naive Bayes classifier, the Laplace mechanism
was employed to add noise to the model parameters prior to their release. The goal was
to allow the data holder to share the private model with an interested party such that
they could make predictions about previously unseen data.
The principle of least information (Dwork and Roth, 2014) dictates that the least
90
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possible amount of information should be published to complete a task. Classification
predicts the class, a categorical variable, to which a new example belongs to. Thus,
for this task, all that is really necessary to publish is the class label and not the model
parameters. A private mechanism which conforms with the principle of least informa-
tion and only releases private predictions is likely to handle privacy constraints more
efficiently.
Such a private classification mechanism would work by first fitting a non-private
model, using established training procedures; then injecting privacy noise only at
the prediction stage. The private prediction procedure would utilize the exponential
mechanism to release the class label, a discrete choice.
For Naive Bayes, the quality function of the exponential mechanism would be the
log posterior probability of each class, computed using the true model parameters. To
satisfy differential privacy, the log posterior could be either thresholded (Williams and
McSherry, 2010) or its sensitivity could be derived. In tune with our intuition, the
exponential mechanism would pick a noisy maximum of the posterior probability of a
class.
For logistic regression, the probability of a class given a test example is determined
by the logistic function (or the softmax) of the dot product of the weights and the
test features. As such, prediction could be directly translated into the exponential
mechanism: the quality function is the dot product of the weights and the features. As
always, sensitivity analysis or thresholding would be in order.
Another possible direction for future work is Bayesian inference of the true model
parameters. In particular, given noisy model parameters, learned by a differentially
private fitting procedure, we could infer the posterior probability of the true parameters
of the model. Then, prediction would be done by averaging the predictions of each
possible true parameter weighted by this parameter’s posterior probability given its noisy
counterpart. Doing prediction in this way is statistically optimal. Although probabilistic
inference with differential privacy has previously been detailed by (Williams and
McSherry, 2010), we believe its application to private Naive Bayes and private logistic
regression would be a useful contribution. It would stimulate the adoption of private
machine learning methods in more practically-oriented communities.
As far as private feature selection is concerned, this work has proposed a solution
for two-class problems. A natural continuation of this work is to provide heuristics for
multi-class problems. Future work could also investigate more sophisticated feature
selection procedures under the differential privacy constraint as well as provide further
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empirical evidence for their performance benefit.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Many of the proposed differentially private machine learning methods have nice asymp-
totic properties, such as asymptotically non-private performance guarantees, polynomial
sample complexities, and computational efficiency. Unfortunately, a number of attempts
to use these algorithms with realistic privacy settings and data have failed to achieve
satisfactory results. The difficulty in applying private algorithms comes from their
intrinsic dependence on dataset dimensionality. With this work we have demonstrated
that private machine learning algorithms can be practical in realistic settings. Through
feature selection we have shown that private classifiers can be easy to train, accurate,
and with manageable data requirements. This work has further established that not all
private machine learning algorithms are created equal. What are only training practical-
ities in non-private settings, such as a classifier’s number of hyperparameters, reliance
on regularization, and so on, are crucial for performance under privacy constraints, and





In the following are listed the details of the several real datasets used throughout this
work.
A.1 XwindowsDoc dataset
This dataset was originally used in (Murphy, 2012) to illustrate feature selection tech-
niques with a naive Bayes classifier. The dataset is available from the pmtk3 download
page (Doe, 2009).
It contains documents from two classes: X windows and MS Windows. The
documents are represented by vectors of length 600, where the binary occurrences or
words are recorded. The dataset contains 900 training samples, 900 test samples, and
600 dimensions. The classes are balanced both in the training and the test sets, so the
majority baseline is 50%. A non-private Naive Bayes classifier obtains accuracy of
92% on the training set and 81% on the test set. Table A.2 shows a list of the most
Name Train set size Test set size Number of features Majority baseline
XWindowsDoc 900 900 600 50%
Mushrooms 5687 2437 112 52%
Adult 32561 16281 123 76%
Newsgroup 5687 2437 100 57%
Newsgroup2 4663 1998 100 81%
Newsgroup3 4663 1998 100 82%
Table A.1: Details of the real UCI datasets used in this work.
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Table A.2: Reducing the dimensionality to use only the top 10 most informative features.
informative features sorted by their mutual information with the class label. Table A.3
shows the number of times the 10 most informative features are on in the two classes.
A.2 Mushrooms dataset
The UCI Mushrooms dataset includes descriptions of hypothetical samples correspond-
ing to 23 species of gilled mushrooms. Each species is identified as definitely edible,
definitely poisonous, or of unknown edibility and not recommended, the latter two
classes combined.
Each nominal attribute is expanded into several binary attributes, as per one-hot
encoding. The original attribute number 12 has missing values and is not used. The
number of training samples is 5687 and number of test samples is 2437. The number of
resulting features is 112.
A.3 Newsgroup1 dataset
This is a binary classification dataset constructed by using the first two classes of the
20newsgroups data from (Lang, 2014). It contains binary occurrence data for 100 words
(features) across 16242 postings.












Table A.3: The number of occurrences of the top 10 most informative features in both
classes. This shows us how sparse the feature are.
A.4 Newsgroup2 dataset
This dataset only uses the third and fourth classes of 20newsgroups to form a binary
classification problem. This dataset is highly imbalanced, with 856 training examples
of class 1 and 3807 examples of class 2. The imbalance was created by taking only a
portion of the documents in class 3 of the original 20newsgroup dataset.
A.5 Newsgroup3 dataset
This dataset only uses the third and fourth classes of 20newsgroups to form a binary
classification problem. This dataset is highly imbalanced, with 849 training examples
of class 1 and 3814 examples of class 2. The imbalance was created by taking only a
portion of the documents in class 2 of the original 20newsgroup dataset.
A.6 Adult Dataset
The Adult dataset from the UCI ML Repository is moderately-sized dataset that contains
demographic information about approximately 47 000 individuals. The task is to predict
whether the annual salary of individuals is below $50 000, based on 105 features, such
as occupation, education, age, etc. This set is imbalanced: the fraction of positive labels
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Figure A.1: Relative sparsity of the Adult, Mushrooms, and Newsgroup2 datasets. We
judge the sparsity by the model parameters obtained by fitting a non-private Naive
Bayes classifier. On the horizontal axis is the feature number. The corresponding model
parameter is on the y axis. The Mushrooms dataset is the least sparse, and Newsgroup2
and Adult are fairly sparse.
is around 1/4, i.e. the majority baseline is 76%.
All samples with missing values were removed and each categorical attribute was
represented with 1-of-K encoding. Each column was normalized such that the maximum
is 1 and each row, such that it’s norm is at most 1.
A.7 Toy datasets
To perform controlled experiments with datasets of different sizes and dimensionality,
it was important to focus on a really simple problem to start with.
We create a simple two-class dataset, where data for each class was sampled from
a Gaussian distribution. The data is non-linearly separable, so that the effects of the
perturbation of the decision boundary are more obvious. In particular,
x(n) 2C1 ⇠N (0,I)
x(n) 2C2 ⇠N (a1,I)
where a is a constant that is used to control the amount of overlap between the two
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where F 1(0.9) is the 0.9-the quantile of the normal distribution.
The toy dataset thusly created is balanced, meaning the prior probability of each
class is around 50%. The samples generated with this procedure are then split into three
sets of equal sizes and used for training, validation, and testing, respectively.
A.8 Preprocessing
To use with Bernoulli Naive Bayes, whenever necessary, features were converted to
binary by discretizing and using 1-of-K encoding.
For logistic regression, categorical variables were 1-of-K encoded. Additionally,





and then translating to [ 1,1]. Finally, to comply with the assumptions of the output
and objective perturbation methods, detailed in Chapter 4, all examples were scaled so
that their Euclidean norm is at most 1.
Appendix B
Appendix 2: Private Logistic
Regression Scalability
This appendix demonstrates the poor scalability with dimensionality of two algorithms
for private logistic regression: the objective perturbation algorithm and the functional
mechanism, both discussed at length in Chapter 4. We further improve the functional
mechanism here to correct the sensitivity of the approximation to the objective function
reported in (Zhang et al., 2012). Experiments are performed on the toy datasets as
detailed in Section A.7, which allow variable settings for size and dimensionality.
B.1 Functional Mechanism
Proposed by Zhang et al. (2012), the functional mechanism for private logistic regres-
sion, referred to from now on as simply the functional mechanism, does not impose
the strong convexity requirements of the Private ERM algorithm described earlier. The
method works with non-regularized logistic regression.
Briefly, the method works by creating a Taylor approximation to the optimization
function and adding noise to its coefficients. The objective function is then perturbed
by applying the Laplace mechanism, where noise is drawn from a Laplace distribution
with scale the sensitivity of the objective function over the privacy parameter, i.e D/e.



















where the coefficients result from the Taylor expansion.
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We refer to the Functional Method using this sensitivity as FMsens1.
The bound on the sensitivity that was reported can be tightened by taking into
account the assumption this algorithm makes that feature vectors are normalized to unit
length. In more detail, all samples in the dataset are normalized so that the Euclidean





x2d  1 (B.3)
In addition, the square root function is concave. Jensen’s inequality applies and states
that a concave transformation of a mean is greater than or equal to the mean after the
concave transformation:
j(E[X ])  E [j(X)] . (B.4)























Contrast this to the D bound that was present in Equation B.2. Similarly, we can bound






The Functional Mechanism with this bound on the sensitivity is referred to as FMsens2
from now on.
We now perform experiments with the Private ERM mechanism, as well as the
Functional Mechanism with both the original and improved bounds on the sensitivity of
the objective function.
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B.2 Experimental Setup
Convergence criterion We consider an algorithm converged when it achieves average
accuracy that is within a certain range from the MAP of the logistic regression. The
tolerance used in reporting the results is around 2% meaning we consider the private
algorithm converged when its accuracy is within 2% of the MAP of logistic regression.
This is not the best criterion of convergence for a number of reasons. To start with in
practice 2% loss in accuracy may not be permissible. Even more importantly, due to
the variance in the noise, it is possible that we accidentally arrived within the desired
distance from the MAP. Thus, it is necessary to correct for any inaccuracies that
may have arisen. This is done by rounding up to the next power of 2 during the
first pass that finds a crude estimate (explained below) and rounding up to the upper
bound of the interval in the finer estimation of N (also explained below). Despite these
shortcomings, this measure is easy to work with and for the purpose of finding out a
crude relationship between the number of examples and the accuracy achieved seems
like a good compromise.
B.3 Results
Here we experiment with several different dimensionality settings and report the results.
Tables B.2 - B.5 show the number of data samples needed for the different algorithms
to converge to the ML. Table B.1 shows the best accuracies we could hope for and the
maximum amount of data that is available to the algorithms in all the settings. Results
were obtained by averaging the results over 10 runs of the randomized algorithms.
Regularization parameters are chosen by cross-validation on a specially allocated cross-
validation set. The privacy parameter is taken to be 0.1, which is a very common
setting.
We now look at how the different algorithms performed under the various dimen-
sionality settings.
Table B.2 shows the number of samples needed for LR to reach the MLE. We see
that in small dimensionality settings, relatively small regularization is needed, which
is not surprising - our model cannot overfit these datasets too much, unless they are
linearly separable, which is not the case due to our setup.
Private ERM Table B.3 shows the number of samples needed for the Private ERM
logistic regression algorithm to reach roughly the same accuracy as the non-private
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logistic regression, together with the regularization parameters picked. We see that
these are quite high compared to the ones for logistic regression. The algorithm has
preferred the first branch of the conditional, which is the one that uses more relaxed
privacy budget (apart from D = 1) and larger regularization. The privacy constraints are
“shared” by the increase in regularization and the noise added.
The bigger regularization parameter says that we are more sure the weights q are
around the new mean of the prior ( 1/lb), and we don’t rely on the data as much as
before. The increase in regularization means that we will reach the MLE more slowly
(i.e. by using more data).
The final column shows how many times more data we need to provide to the private
logistic regression in order to get close to the MLE value of logistic regression. We
see that Private ERM is fairly well-behaved: the multipliers grow linearly with the
dimensionality of the data. Since the results are not exact, we can’t give a precise
constant of growth, but it’s not unreasonable to guess 2. The main point is that there
is no exponential increase in the number of samples needed when we increase the
dimensionality. Having said that, significant amount of additional data is necessary for
good performance, making this algorithm impractical in a lot of real-world settings.
Functional Mechanism Table B.4 shows the results for FM with the original
reported sensitivity. Even for trivial dimensionality settings this method requires
unreasonable amounts of additional data: for D = 5 we need 256 times more data than
normal to reach values close to the MLE. For bigger dimensions the standard error
increases and we no longer have a very reliable estimate of the number of samples
needed, but it is easy to see that this would be very high. These results are not surprising
given the quadratic reliance of the sensitivity on the dimensionality of the data. This
algorithm is impractical for any dimensionality bigger than 10.
Table B.5 shows the results for FM with the improved sensitivity. We get improve-
ments for smaller dimensions and even reasonably good performance for up to D = 20.
This is more encouraging than the results from FMsens1, but still does not beat the
Private ERM method. Where it might make a difference is in the running time. Because
of the quadratic approximation, the minimum can be found analytically, which is faster
than using an iterative approach.
We run two more experiments with PrivateERM and FMsens2 to confirm these
expectations. We give the algorithms even more training data. Table B.6 shows the
results for PrivateERM with the smaller value of e. Indeed the multipliers are much
larger - 16 times bigger than the ones for e = 0.1. Incidentally, 16 is the nearest power
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Truth
D l All N Accuracy
1 1e-06 1024 88.0
2 1e-06 4096 91.9
5 1 4096 89.9
10 1e+02 4096 89.1
20 1e+03 8192 90.0
50 1 1048576 89.9
100 1e+03 524288 90.0
1000 1e+03 1048576 90.0
1500 1e+03 1048576 90.0
Table B.1: True accuracy and total number of samples. This table shows the maximum
data that was available to all algorithms in training. The accuracy is the best that we
could hope for on every dataset.
LR
D l N Accuracy
1 1e-06 16 88.0
2 0.1 16 91.9
5 1 16 88.3
10 1 32 87.6
20 10 128 88.6
50 1 256 88.0
100 10 512 88.3
1000 1e+03 16384 88.1
1500 1e+03 32768 88.0
Table B.2: MAP results for Logistic Regression on various datasets. We show the
minimum number of samples that get us close to the MLE, accurate to a power of 2.
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PrivateERM
D l N Accuracy Standard Error Multipliers
1 0.0001 256 88.0 0 16
2 1e+02 512 90.8 0.7 32
5 1e+02 1024 88.3 0.4 64
10 1e+03 2048 87.3 0.4 64
20 1e+03 8192 87.9 0.3 64
50 10 131072 88.0 0.2 512
100 1e+03 65536 88.1 0.1 128
1000 1e+03 1048576 79.1 0.2 64
1500 1e+03 1048576 70.5 0.3 32
Table B.3: Number of samples needed for PrivateERM to get close to the MLE of LR
for e = 0.1, accurate to a power of 2. The multipliers show many times more data is
required compared to Logistic Regression.
FMsens1
D N Accuracy Standard Error Multipliers
1 256 88.0 0 16
2 1024 90.7 0.9 64
5 4096 85.9 0.9 256
10 4096 61.6 2.7 128
20 8192 55.8 3.6 64
50 1048576 66.9 2.3 4096
100 524288 50.7 0.9 1024
1000 1048576 49.6 0.4 64
1500 1048576 50.1 0.3 32
Table B.4: Number of samples needed for FMsens1 to get close to the MLE of LR.
Regularization is ignored by the algorithm, since it is taken to be 4 times the standard
deviation of the Laplace noise added. We see that the multipliers here are much worse
when the dimensionality grows.
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FMsens2
D N Accuracy Standard Error Multipliers
1 128 88.0 0 8
2 512 89.9 1.2 32
5 4096 86.9 0.7 256
10 4096 82.4 1.3 128
20 8192 68.4 1.8 64
50 1048576 75.2 3.1 4096
100 524288 68.1 1.6 1024
1000 1048576 50.9 0.4 64
1500 1048576 50.6 0.2 32
Table B.5: Number of samples needed for FMsens2 to get close to the MLE for e = 0.1.
Regularization is again ignored. Multipliers are worse than those for the Private ERM,
but we get better performance where we can.
of 2 bigger than 10 and since our results are exact to powers of 2, this confirms our
expectations. The situation is similar for FMsens2 as shown in table B.7.
B.4 Discussion
In very low dimensions the recommended method for private logistic regression is the
Functional Mechanism with improved sensitivity: it needs roughly the same amount
of additional data as the Private ERM and the optimum can be found analytically. In
higher dimensions, we suggest using the Private ERM method.
In these experiments regularizers were selected by non-private cross-validation.
To preserve end-to-end privacy some of the privacy budget should be spent on cross-
validation (Chaudhuri and Vinterbo, 2013b).
To summarize, these are not great results for differential privacy. Although in the
limit of infinite data all of these methods approach the MLE (ignoring the approximation
error in the Function Mechanism), the amount of additional data required is prohibitive.
Even for these relatively easy problems (balanced classes, low-dimensional dense
features) we need too much additional data to get reasonable performance.
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PrivateERM
D l N Accuracy Standard Error Multipliers
1 0.01 4096 89.9 0.0 256
2 1e-05 8192 88.2 0.7 512
5 1e+03 16384 88.3 0.3 1024
10 1e+03 32768 88.3 0.3 1024
20 1e+03 131072 88.6 0.2 1024
Table B.6: Number of samples needed for PrivateERM to get close to the MLE, for
e = 0.01. Multipliers for this epsilon are 16 times larger than those for the smaller
e = 0.1.
FMsens2
D N Accuracy Standard Error Multipliers
1 4096 89.9 0.0 256
2 8192 88.1 0.8 512
5 65536 88.3 0.3 4096
10 131072 88.2 0.5 4096
20 262144 77.5 1.6 2048
Table B.7: Number of samples needed for FMsens2 to get close to the MLE. We also
see an increase of around 16 times in these multipliers compared to multipliers for
FMsens2 with e = 0.1.
PrivateERM
D l N Accuracy Standard Error Multipliers
1 0.1 512 88.1 1.2 32
2 0.01 2048 91.0 0.3 128
5 1e+02 2048 88.0 0.4 128
10 1e+02 4096 84.2 1.2 128
20 1e+02 8192 82.7 0.9 64
Table B.8: Number of samples needed for PrivateERM to get close to the MLE for the
second type of feature scaling. These results are even worse for differential privacy: the
algorithm gives up faster, and requires more data even in lower dimensions.
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